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BUSH, OBAMA AND BEYOND: 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROSPECT OF 
FACT CHECKING EXECUTIVE 
DEPARTMENT THREAT CLAIMS BEFORE 
THE USE OF FORCE 
Leslie Gielow Jacobs* 
INTRODUCTION 
Threats are scary. When they are real we should, of course, 
as a Nation address them, with force if necessary. When they are 
not, however, they should be exposed as what they are before 
the use of force. But, as the Iraq War experience demonstrates 
most recently, the fact checking that is essential to ensure the ac­
curacy of executive department threat claims is not happening. 
Rather, a pattern has developed whereby Presidents persuade 
the Na ti on to consent to the use of force based upon threat 
claims for which they are effectively unaccountable until after 
the decision has been made. 1  Although presidents may legiti­
mately advocate persuasively in support of their chosen policy, 
the Constitution identifies the people, through Congress, as the 
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. Thanks 
to the following people for helpful comments on earlier drafts: Bill Banks, Anne Bloom, 
Kathleen Clark, Michael Colatrella, Richard Collins, Heidi Kitrosser, Brian Landsberg, 
Thom Main, Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker and Kevin Stack. Thanks to Matthew Downs, 
Michael Claiborne and Rebecca Whitfield for excellent research assistance. 
1. Whether or not the existence of these threats explained the administration's 
push for war, they were the primary reasons for the use of force offered by the President 
and other executive branch officials in their advocacy. See JOHN DIAMOND, THE CIA 
AND THE CULTURE OF FAILURE 13 (2008) ("The Bush team genuinely believed that Iraq 
had some banned weapons . . . .  But the administration considered Iraqi weaponry to be 
a manageable threat. The problem was the future and what Iraq might do with its oil 
money once it was free from the crushing international sanctions.");  see also Associated 
Press, Wolfowitz Comments Revive Doubts over Iraq's WMD, USA TODAY, June 1 ,  
2003, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003 05 30 wolfowitz iraq_x.htm ("[W]e 
settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass de
struction as the core reason." (quoting Paul Wolfowitz)); S.  REP . No. 110 345, at 1 
(2008), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/110345.pdf (reviewing executive 
department threat claims and characterizing them as "central to the nation's decision to 
go to war") .  
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ones who must decide whether the president's choice is the right 
one.2 That presidents can routinely make threat claims without 
contemporaneous accountability represents a failure of democ­
racy in the use-of-force decision making and oversight process, 
since informed consent requires that the decision makers under­
stand at least the basic facts upon which the President's pro­
posed policy is based. 
Part I sets out the experience of the last Administration's 
use of inflated threat claims to persuade the country to consent 
to the use of force in Iraq. Against this backdrop, Part II com­
pares the current President's use of threat claims and the effec­
tiveness of the mechanisms for fact checking his persuasive ad­
vocacy in support of the use of force in Afghanistan. Although 
the comparison must be imperfect, it supports the observation 
that, while different office holders may make different choices, 
the structures and incentives that have in the past allowed execu­
tive branch officials to assert unverified threats as certain and 
sufficient to justify the use of force have not changed significant­
ly. While certain types of legal reforms could help to impose ac­
countability on executive branch actors who make threat claims, 
they are both unlikely to be enacted or, if enacted, to be effec­
tively enforced, at least in the short term. In response to this re­
ality, Part III proposes that some progress toward the elusive 
goal of effective democratic use of force decision making can be 
achieved by approaching the problem of potentially inflated ex­
ecutive department threat claims from the other side of the 
communication exchange. Several key recognitions about the na­
ture of use of force advocacy and the secret intelligence informa­
tion that executive branch actors may offer to support it, and 
about the incentives of surrogates who can help interpret what 
that information means, can help shore up listener defenses to 
2. The Constitution grants Congress the power to "declare War" and other powers 
that indicate the Framers intended it to actively oversee use of force decision making. 
U.S. CONST. art. I , § 8 (Congress's powers related to use of force policy making include: 
" [To] provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States," "To 
declare War," "To raise and support Armies," "To provide and maintain a Navy," "To 
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces. "). De
bates among the Framers reinforce the conclusion that this allocation of responsibility 
reflects a considered judgment that, absent a sudden attack that requires immediate ac
tion, the deliberative processes of Congress should be the ones through which the con
sent of the people to use of force is obtained, and that such deliberation was to act as a 
check on an eager, aggressive, and potentially persuasive executive. Louis Fisher, Un
checked Presidential Wars, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1651 (2000). But see John C. Yoo, 
The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Pow
ers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996) (the framers intended that the President be able to in
itiate wars). 
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government speech, and specifically threat claims, and thereby 
bolster the contemporaneous accountability of use of force ad­
vocacy. 
I. USE OF FORCE ADVOCACY, THREAT CLAIMS AND 
THE LACK OF CONTEMPORANEOUS 
ACCOUNTABILITY BEFORE THE IRAQ WAR 
The Iraq War experience illustrates the government struc­
tures, incentives, and behaviors that now unite in "perfect 
storm" combination to lead to the result that executive branch 
actors can make threat claims in support of the use of force for 
which they are effectively unaccountable until after the policy 
choice is made. 
Aggressive and Persuasive Use of Threat Claims in Support 
of the Use of Force. Modern presidents exist at the center of in­
creasingly massive, multi-faceted communications machines.3 Al­
though one purpose of executive branch communications is to 
provide information to the public, a fundamental unabashed 
purpose is to advocate for the President's policies. Engaging in 
persuasive government speech is a crucial component of the ex­
ercise of any President's constitutional authority. The President 
enjoys an advocacy advantage over any other communicators in 
the Nation, and, arguably, the world. He is a single person, and 
can coordinate executive branch messages.4 He has a vast staff to 
keep track of the many sources of information dispersal and to 
keep them in line. Although one-sided and aggressive, persua­
sive presidential speech is a legitimate and appropriate tool for 
governing because the President, like other government speak­
ers, operates under a democratic mandate to implement policies 
through all legal and effective means, including speech, and he is 
accountable to those he governs for the content of his speech.5 
3. MARTHA JOYNT KUMAR, MANAGING THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE 4 6 (2007) 
(describing how the President's communication operations have grown through several 
administrations). 
4. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 865, 886 (2007) ("[T]he executive can act with much greater unity, force and dis
patch than can Congress, which is chronically hampered by the need for debate and con
sensus among large numbers.") .  
5 .  Democratic accountability is the important attribute that distinguishes the Free 
Speech Clause category of "government speech." Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 
S. Ct. 1 125, 1 132 (2009) (noting that a government entity is ultimately "accountable to 
the electorate and the political process for its advocacy" (quoting Board of Regents v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)). While the Constitution limits government control 
of private speech, government actors may engage in "government speech" that advocates 
in favor of some and discriminates against other controversial viewpoints. Pleasant 
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The President bears the constitutional responsibility to dis­
cern threats to homeland security and to address them.6 Like all 
actions of a democratic government, the use of force should oc­
cur with the consent of the governed to the President's proposed 
policy, informed by an understanding of the facts that support 
the choice. Consequently, Presidents may legitimately and ap­
propriately advocate that immediate and grave threats to homel­
and security exist for the purpose of persuading those he governs 
to consent to the use of force. 
In the year before the Iraq War, President Bush, in combi­
nation with others in his Administration, used threat claims as 
the primary component of a strategic and coordinated communi­
cations campaign to build consent to his policy choice to use 
force. These communications included formal speeches,7 media 
interviews,8 congressional briefin�s,9 and documents delivered to 
Congress and released publicly. 1  In these communications, ex-
Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (government may "select the views that it wants to express") .  
"Accountability" means that the process by which the message is created is subject to 
"political safeguards," and that a "politically accountable official" or politically account
able body is responsible for the content. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 
563 64 (2005). Effective accountability means that the electorate can understand, eva
luate and react to government speech. Pleasant Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 1 132 ("If the citize
nry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary posi
tion. " (quoting Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235)). Enforcing structures of accountability is a 
principle that underpins decisions with respect to other parts of the Constitution. See 
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (line item veto); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (commandeering); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (legis
lative veto). 
6. The President is Commander in Chief of the armed forces. U.S. CONST. art. II § 
2, cl. 1 .  
7. S. REP. No. 110 345, at  5, available a t  http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy. 
pdf (quoting President Bush's 2003 State of the Union Address, in which he stated, "the 
British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quanti
ties of uranium form Africa") ;  id. (quoting President Bush's speech in Cincinnati on Oct. 
7, 2002, in which he stated that Saddam Hussein was "moving ever closer to developing a 
nuclear weapon" and that Iraq "could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year"). 
8. James Gerstenzang, Bush Promises Postwar Aid if Hussein Toppled, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, at 21 ("Delay, indecision and inaction are not options for America, 
because they could lead to massive and sudden horror." (quoting President Bush)) .  De
borah Orin, Iraq Slams the Door: Rejects New U.N. Orders on Weapons, N.Y. POST, Sept. 
29, 2002, at 4 ("The dangers we face will only worsen from month to month and year to 
year. To ignore these threats is to encourage them." (quoting President Bush's Sept. 28 
radio address)) .  
9 .  See H.R. Doc. No. 107 229 (2002) (in a statement made by President Bush to 
the House of Representatives about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction he said 
that nuclear activity in Iraq is believed to have continued since the UN inspections 
stopped in December 1998); see also H.R. Doc. No. 107 175 (2002) (President Bush 
urged for the deployment of troops against Saddam Hussein's "record of aggressive be
havior" in order to acquire Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, to protect Iraq's neigh
bors and protect the Kurds in the northern region). 
10. See 145 CONG. REC. E1545 46, E1567 (statements of Rep. King) (including in 
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ecutive branch officials repeatedly asserted as true that the Iraq 
(1) possessed the weapons capacity to pose an actual and imme­
diate threat to the security of neighboring nations and the Unit­
ed States; (2) possessed means of delivering the existing weapons 
into neighboring countries, and perhaps into the United States; 
(3) was inclined to attack other countries , including the United 
States; and (4) was offering support, including weapons, to non­
nation terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda, which perpe­
trated the September 11, 2001 attacks.11 Various sources have 
compiled the hundreds of these types of threat claims made by 
Bush Administration officials during the lead-up to the Iraq 
War.12 Examples include the following: 
The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons, 
is rebuilding the facilities to make more and, according to the 
British government, could launch a biological or chemical at­
tack in as little as 45 minutes after the order is given .... This 
regime is seeking a nuclear bomb, and with fissile material 
could build one within a year.13 
Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has 
weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amass­
ing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and 
• 14 agamst us. 
We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have high-level contacts that 
go back a decade .... We've learned that Iraq has trained al 
Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly 15 gases. 
The Iraqi regime ... possesses and produces chemical and bi-
the record the unclassified version of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate 
that was delivered to Congress in classified version and released publicly in unclassified 
form). 
1 1. See S. REP. No. 1 10 345, supra note 1 .  
12. See COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, IRAQ ON THE RECORD, 108th 
CONG., REPORT ON THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ 5 
(Comm. Print 2004); Charles Lewis & Mark Reading Smith, False Pretenses, CTR. FOR 
PUB. INTEGRITY, Jan. 23, 2008, http://projects.publicintegrity.org/WarCard/ ("President 
George W. Bush and seven of his administration's top officials, including Vice President 
Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Secretary Do
nald Rumsfeld, made at least 935 false statements in the two years following September 
11 ,  2001, about the national security threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq.") .  
13. President George W. Bush, The President's Radio Address, 38 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. Doc. 1656, 1657 (Sept. 28, 2002). 
14. Vice President Dick Cheney, Address to the National Convention of the Veter
ans of Foreign Wars (Aug. 26, 2002), available at http://georgewbush
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html. 
15. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Iraq From Cincinnati, 
Ohio, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1716, 1717 (Oct. 7, 2002). 
438 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:433 
ological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons .... We could 
wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terror­
ists, or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But 
I'm convinced that is a hope against all evidence.16 
Additionally, executive department advocates strategically 
planned their rhetoric and presentations to make use of "grip­
ping images," such as the "smoking gun" that might be a "mu­
shroom cloud,"17 the lump of material "a little larger than a sin­
gle softball" that could become a nuclear weapon,18 and the vial 
of "anthrax" wielded by Secretary of State Colin Powell to illu­
strate the claims made in his United Nations Security Council 
h 19 speec . 
The Bush Administration presented facts about threats 
posed by Iraq for the purpose of influencing the public discus­
sion and conclusions about the policy the President advocated 
and sought to have the Nation embrace. By presenting threats 
posed by Iraq as actual, imminent, and potentially directed at the 
homeland, the President and his advisors were able to argue that 
war was a necessity not a choice.20 By means of threat claims, the 
Administration was able to present the justifications for war as 
simple and concrete, 21 and in terms that invoked patriotism22 and 
16. S.  REP. No. 110 345, supra note 1, at 4 5 (quoting President George W. Bush, 
supra note 15, at 1716, 1719). 
17. RICHARD A. BEST, JR ., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND 
POLICYMAKING 6 n.15 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS21696.pdf 
(citing Barton Gellman & Walter Pincus, Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evi
dence, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2003, at Al); see also Bush Cites Saddam's 'Arsenal of Ter
ror', CNN, Oct. 8, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/07/bush.iraq/ 
index.html ("Facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof the smok
ing gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud." (quoting George W. 
Bush)); Wolf Blitzer, Search for the Smoking Gun, CNN, Jan. 10, 2003, 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Ol/10/wbr.smoking.gun ("The problem here is that there 
will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear weapons. But 
we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud." (quoting Condoleeza Rice in 
2002)) .  
18 .  President George W. Bush, supra note 15 ,  a t  1718  ("If the Iraqi regime i s  able 
to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a sin
gle softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year.") .  
19 .  See, e.g. , The Record on Curveball: Declassified Documents and Key Partici
pants Show the Importance of Phony Intelligence in the Origins of the Iraq War, NAT'L 
SECURITY ARCHIVE, Nov. 5, 2007, http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ 
NSAEBB234/index.htm. 
20. John M. Schuessler, Deception and the Iraq War 8 14 (Aug. 28, 2008), (unpub
lished paper presented at the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting), available at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research citation/2/7/9/1/1/p279113 index. 
html see also Chaim Kaufmann, Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of 
Ideas, 29 INT'L SECURITY 5, 7 8 (2004), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ 
files/kaufmann. pdf. 
21. See Jeffrey M. Cavanaugh, From the 'Red Juggernaut' to Iraqi WMDs: Threat 
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emotions,23 all important elements to garnering public support 
for a complex and costly foreign commitment. 
The Bush Administration's threat advocacy was designed to 
build consent to the use of force and it did so. A chart produced 
in a House Report records the number of statements about the 
Iraq threat made by executive department officials sharply peak­
ing in the several weeks before Congress voted to authorize the 
President to use force.24 The Report of the House Committee on 
International Relations explained that it embraced the executive 
branch's factual assertions about the Iraq threat and based its 
recommendation that the body vote to authorize the use of force 
upon it.25 Individual House Members and Senators who had in­
itially expressed reluctance to consent to the use of force ex­
plained their votes in favor as based on their belief that the 
threat claims advocated by the executive department were true.26 
Inflation and How It Succeeds in the United States, 122 POL. Ser. Q. 555, 566 (2007) 
("Apathy, ignorance, and the cost of acquiring quality sources of information are disin
centives mitigating public willingness to examine an administration's foreign policy in 
detail."); see also John Zaller, Elite Leadership of Mass Opinion, in TAKEN BY STORM 
186, 188 (W. Lance Bennett & David L. Paletz eds., 1994) ("Few members of the general 
public should be expected to engage in independent thought and analysis on foreign poli
cy issues. The most that can be expected is that they choose among competing elite and 
media messages.") .  
22. One incentive to make threat claims is the "rally around the flag" bump in pub
lic popularity that Presidents tend to achieve when they forcefully confront an enemy. 
JOHN E. MUELLER, WAR, PRESIDENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 58 59 (1973). See also 
Jane K. Cramer, Militarized Patriotism and the Success of Threat Inflation, in AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF FEAR 135, 137 (A. Trevor Thrall & Jane K. 
Cramer eds., 2009) (presenting extensive evidence, with respect to the Iraq War vote, to 
support the claim that "most Democrats and many Republicans deferred to the executive 
branch not on the merits of the case, but because they did not want to appear weak on 
defense or unpatriotic");  George McGovern, Patriotism is Nonpartisan, NATION, Apr.1, 
2005, at 30, available at http://www.thenation.com/article/patriotism nonpartisan. 
23 . Advocacy that includes threat claims may be particularly potent because of the 
public tendency to systematically overvalue low probability/high impact threats, such as 
terrorism. Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1323 24 
(2007) (making this argument in the context of official claims that speech will cause a 
national security threat). 
24. COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, IRAQ ON THE RECORD, 108th CONG., 
REPORT ON THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ 5 (Comm. 
Print 2004). 
25. H.R. REP. No. 107 721 , at 7 8 (2002), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1001 
("Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and 
international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material and 
unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to 
possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively 
seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organiza
tions . . . .  The continuing threat posed by Iraq is the motivation for the Committee's fa
vorable action on [the proposed joint resolution to authorize the use of force] .") .  
26. See Thomas Oliphant, Op Ed., Bush's Victory Cost Plenty, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Oct. 13, 2002, at Dll (reluctant Bush supporters Senators Chuck Hagel, John Kerry and 
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Following the October 2002 votes by Congress to authorize the 
use of force,27 the executive department continued to engage in 
advocacy about the threat posed by Iraq. The President used his 
January 2003 State of the Union address as a platform to advo­
cate the multiple threats posed by Iraq,28 and in his February ad­
dress to the United Nations Security Council, Secretary of State 
Colin Powell presented detailed threat claims to the world.29 
Public opinion polls indicate that these advocacy efforts moved 
public opinion in favor of the use of force against Iraq.30 In par­
ticular, public support for the use of force in Iraq correlated with 
believing executive department threat claims.31 
We know now that these threat claims were not true.32 In­
stead, Congress and the American people gave their consent to 
use of force in Iraq based at least in significant part upon inflated 
threat claims.33 One source of threat inflation were the raw intel­
ligence and assessments offered by parts of the intelligence 
community, which grew increasingly urgent and dire over the 
Hillary Rodham Clinton gave yes votes to the use of force by taking President Bush at 
his word). 
27. Alison Mitchell & Carl Hulse, Congress Authorizes Bush to Use Force Against 
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11 ,  2002, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/ 
11/national/1 lIRAQ.html ?pagewanted=all. 
28. George W. Bush, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 
2003) available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/ ALLPOLITICS/01/28/sotu. transcript/. 
29. Colin Powell, Secretary of State, Address to United Nations Security Council 
(Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript/. 
30. Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 30. An October 2002 Pew Research Center Report 
on public opinions noted "broad agreement that Saddam Hussein either already has or is 
close to having nuclear weapons." Generations Divide over Military Action in Iraq, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR . ,  Oct. 17, 2002, http://people press.org/commentary/?analysisid=57. In 
February 2003 Pew recorded that the combination of President Bush's State of the Union 
address and Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to the United Nations had 
significantly moved United States public opinion in favor of military action against Iraq, 
with four separate polls showing that a majority of Americans judged that the Bush ad
ministration had made a "convincing case." Powell Reversed the Trend but not the Tenor 
of Public Opinion, PEW RESEARCH CTR. , Feb. 14, 2003, http://people
press.org/commentary/?analysisid=62. But see GEORGE EDWARDS, ON DEAF EARS ix, xi 
(2003) (reproducing Gallup Poll results to support his conclusion that in response to the 
President's "rhetorical efforts" to support war in Iraq, "public opinion barely moved"). 
31. STEVEN KULL, MISPERCEPTIONS, THE MEDIA AND THE IRAQ WAR 2 (2003), 
available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/oct03/IraqMedia Oct03_rpt.pdf. 
32. See S. REP. No. 109 331 (2006). 
33. Threat inflation "is the attempt by elites to create concern for a threat that goes 
beyond the scope and urgency that a disinterested analysis would justify. Jane K. Cramer 
& A. Trevor Thrall, Introduction, in AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF 
FEAR 1, 1 (A. Trevor Thrall & Jane K. Cramer eds., 2009). A simple model of the threat 
inflation process proceeds as follows: "elites perceive threats, create communication 
strategies to inflate threats, implement those strategies within the news media, or mar
ketplace of ideas, in an attempt to shape opinions and influence policy, and either suc
ceed or fail to do so." Id. at 2 3. 
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course of the approximately 18 months between the September 
2002 terrorist attacks and the beginning of the war against Iraq.34 
The other source of threat inflation were the testimony, briefings 
and public statements of executive department officials, who re­
peatedly exaggerated the certainty, unanimity and imminence of 
the Iraq threats beyond those held by the intelligence communi­
ty.35 Observers differ as to the underlying reasons for the threat 
inflation and the motivations of the executive branch officials 
who engaged in it. 36 What is clear, however, is that the threat in­
flation communications campaign engaged in by the President 
and his close advisors to persuade Congress and the public to 
consent to his policy choice resulted in a failure of democratic 
governance. With the facts misunderstood, Congress members 
and the public consented to the use of force based upon a fun­
damental misunderstanding of the policy choice to be made. 
And it is hardly the first time that this kind of misunders­
tanding has occurred. Instead, executive department threat infla­
tion to build consent to the use of force has become a bleak pat­
tern some might call it a "winning strategy" -identified by 
many after the use of force and by some as it is ongoing, but not 
enough to redirect the public debate and deliberation toward the 
truth of the facts asserted and the real reasons that the executive 
branch advocates war.37 It is not obvious that this pattern can be 
34. Joseph Cirincoine et al., WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications, CARNEGIE 
ENDOWMENT FOR lNT'L PEACE, Jan. 2004. 
35. See S. REP. No. 110 345 (2008), supra note 1 .  
36. See Cramer & Thrall, supra note 22, at 1 2 ("To date scholars have offered a 
wide range of arguments about why the Bush administration has sought to inflate threats 
since 9/11 and Iraq in particular. Many observers insist that much of the threat exaggera
tion since 9/11  has been intentional, politically opportunistic and even self serving. Oth
ers see the administration as sincere, led by long held ideology to see the post 9/11 world 
as extremely threatening. Some scholars point the finger at neoconservatives in key posi
tions; arguing that they pressed their worldview on the administration and hijacked the 
decision making process regarding Iraq. Others have argued that common psychological 
short cuts in reasoning biased the threat perception process and most likely significantly 
account for the widespread misperceptions among administration leaders and their fol
lowers. Still others find the threat inflation process likely to be at root politically moti
vated, but nonetheless primarily institutionally determined and perhaps even necessary 
to exaggerate threats to enable bold foreign policy initiatives. Finally, a few scholars have 
assessed the post 9/11 era and found simply a series of heightened fears, unavoidable in
telligence failures, and mistakes in judgment."). 
37. See, e.g., JOHN QUIGLEY, THE RUSES FOR WAR 14 (1992) (documenting a pat
tern, since World War I, of executive department use of force advocacy that "omit[ted] 
inconvenient details and exaggerated hazards"); see also The Executive Accountability 
Act of 2009: Hearing Before the Crime Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, lllth 
Cong. (2009), available at http://loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/pdf/H.R. %20743.testimony. 
2009.pdf (statement of Louis Fisher, Specialist in Constitutional Law, Law Library of the 
Library of Congress); Id. app. A (documenting misleading justifications for war); 
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broken. That it exists , however, suggests that understanding how 
it happened, in its most recent incarnation, is the first step to­
ward determining whether the current government structures, 
incentives and behaviors create the possibility that it could hap­
pen again. Obtaining this understanding requires identifying the 
checks that were supposed to have been operating to render ex­
ecutive department officials contemporaneously accountable for 
their threat claims, and why these processes failed. 
Information Control in Support of Threat Claims. One ac­
countability check on executive department fact claims made in 
support of advocacy stems from the free speech guarantee, and 
the marketplace of ideas that it protects. Free speech leads to 
contemporaneous accountability of executive department fact 
claims according to a chain of assumptions and events because 
other actors, in and out of government, have access to the facts 
that bear upon the debate and have the incentive and ability to 
publicly contest the President's claims. That this information is 
available means that the President and his officials can be held 
contemporaneously accountable for what they say. That they 
understand that incorrect or incomplete fact claims can be ex­
posed and if so, will undercut their credibility, dampens their in­
centives to misrepresent facts intentionally or inadvertently, and 
so encourages diligence and thoroughness in information gather­
ing and assessment. Although most members of the public may 
not grasp the details of the policy decision to be made or be able 
or willing to verify the facts asserted independently, through de­
bate filtered by credible experts they can understand the rele­
vant facts and how they relate to the policy choice to be made, 
and can reach opinions and express preferences on the broad 
policy, which means that the laws that are made reflect the con­
sent of those who are governed in this indirect way. 38 
A barrier to achieving this kind of contemporaneous ac­
countability for threat claims asserted by the executive depart­
ment to build support for the use of force is its superior access to 
and control over the intelligence information that forms the ba­
sis of the claims. Collecting intelligence information relevant to 
EUGENE SECUNDA & TERENCE P. MORAN, SELLING WAR TO AMERICA 1(2007) ("[T]o 
sell . . .  wars, U.S. presidents regularly distort the truth and withhold crucial information 
from the public, exploiting whatever media and marketing techniques are available at the 
time. ") .  
38. JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION (1992) (pro­
posing the "elite discourse" model of public opinion formation discussed and applied 
here in the Iraq War context). 
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assessing threats to national security is a government activity. 
Within the government, the intelligence agencies and military 
departments that gather and analyze intelligence information are 
under the direct control of the President.39 No other domestic 
entity-not Congress, not the media, not private organizations -
has the ability to obtain intelligence information of the same vo­
lume, quality and timeliness or to provide comprehensive as­
sessments of comparable credibility and authority.40 The Presi­
dent has the authority and responsibility to restrict public access 
to intelliEence information for the purpose of protecting national 
security. 1 To the extent that the President exercises his ability to 
limit access to the facts that he uses to advocate for his use of 
force policy,42 the free speech guarantee may be insufficient to 
provide a contemporaneous accountability check on the threat 
claims he makes. 
Members of the Bush Administration exercised their ability 
to control access to threat assessment information to support 
their pro-war advocacy in two separate, but related, ways. First, 
administration officials controlled release of the entire body of 
39. See generally Intelligence.gov, http://intelligence.gov/about the intelligence
community/ (setting out the structure of the intelligence community). 
40. Memorandum from Alfred Cumming, Specialist in Intelligence and Nat'l Sec., 
Cong. Research Serv., to Senator Dianne Feinstein (Dec. 14, 2005), 
http://feinstein.senate.gov/crs intel.htm (the President and his most senior advisors have 
access to more and better intelligence, and they are better positioned to judge its quality 
and to request that inconclusive information be expanded or supplemented). In particu
lar, Congress does not have access to the President's Daily Brief, or to the meeting in 
which it is presented, which allows the President "full access to intelligence community 
officials and provides a set time each day when he can ask senior intelligence officials 
about the basis for their judgments." Walter Pincus, Lawmakers Focus on Daily Brief In 
Prewar Intelligence Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2005, at AS, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp dyn/content/ article/2005/11/18/ AR20051l1802578. 
html. A member of the Senate Intelligence Committee confirms that intelligence agen
cies do not readily volunteer information. To get it, "you have to ask the right questions." 
Dana Priest, Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 
2004, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp dyn/A44837
2004Apr26?language=printer (quoting Sen. Mike De Wine). 
41. See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (2009) (titled as "Classified Na
tional Security Information," prescribing "a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, 
and declassifying national security information, including information relating to defense 
against transnational terrorism,'' which includes classification of information pertaining 
to "intelligence sources or methods"); KEVIN R. KOSAR, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
POLICY AND PROCEDURE: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED (2009), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/97 771_20091231 .pdf (describing the history of the classifi
cation system and the changes in President Obama's executive order). 
42. The ability of the President and executive department agencies to classify in
formation and prevent its release may extend well beyond their actual authority to do so. 
See, e.g. , NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE U.S., 9/11  COMMISSION 
REPORT 417, available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf ("Current se
curity requirements nurture overclassification."). 
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threat assessment information to which they had access so that 
the information presented to Congress, the media and the public 
did not accurately reflect the contents of the information within 
their control, but instead supported the use of force policy. 
Second, administration officials controlled the process by which 
raw intelligence was collected and analyses produced so that the 
content of the information within their control changed, to more 
robustly support the use of force policy. 
The President and his top officials relied on controlled in­
formation release in a number of ways to support their use of 
force advocacy. That they withheld much information within 
their control meant that they could rely upon the public's know­
ledge that they had superior access to the entire body of existing 
information to characterize the facts with greater certainty than 
the content of the information reflected, to omit mention of dis­
sent, to suggest that they had more and better quality informa­
tion than they presented, and to ask the public to embrace the 
truth of the threat claims based on trust rather than proof.43 They 
selectively released pieces of raw intelligence that supported 
their claims,44 without disclosing that intelligence experts disa­
greed about whether the evidence was significant or whether its 
source was credible.45 They did not release raw intelligence or in­
telligence community assessments that undercut their argument 
that Iraq presented an immediate threat.46 Top officials who had 
43. Elisabeth Bumiller & James Dao, Eyes On Iraq; Cheney Says Peril of A Nuclear 
Iraq Just�fies Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2002, at Al, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/27 /world/ eyes on iraq cheney says peril of a nuclear
iraq justifies attack.html ?pagewan ted=all (" [T]here is no doubt that Saddam Hussein 
now has weapons of mass destruction . . . .  [T]here is no doubt that he is amassing them to 
use against our friends, against our allies and against us." (quoting Vice President Che
ney)) .  
44. See Louis Fisher, Deciding o n  War Against Iraq, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 389, 401 
(2003) (describing selective declassification of satellite photographs purportedly demon
strating that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program); see also Murray Waas, Cheney 
'Authorized' Libby to Leak Classified Information, NAT'L J., Feb. 9, 2006, available at 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stori�s/2006/0209nj1.htm ("Vice Presi
dent Dick Cheney's former chief of staff, I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby, testified to a federal 
grand jury that he had been 'authorized' by Cheney and other White House 'superiors' in 
the summer of 2003 to disclose classified information to journalists to defend the Bush 
administration's use of prewar intelligence in making the case to go to war with Iraq."). 
45. See S. REP. No. 108 301, at 28 29 (2004), available at http://intelligence.senate. 
gov/108301.pdf (finding that the Director of Central Intelligence did not present dissent
ing views within the intelligence community about the significance of evidence purpor
tedly demonstrating Iraq's ongoing efforts to create nuclear weapons to executive de
partment policy makers); Joby Warrick, Evidence on Iraq Challenged; Experts Question 
if Tubes Were Meant for Weapons Program, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2002, at A18. 
46. In the early months of 2002, executive officials investigated suspicions that Iraq 
had attempted to obtain weapons grade uranium from Niger, including sending an emis
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iterated facts that did not support administration policy came to 
embrace the alternative facts and articulate them publicly.47 In­
telligence analysts did not generally dissent publicly.48 Those who 
spoke out �enerally did so anonymously, which undercut their 
credibility.4 Members of the executive branch enlisted private 
experts as "message multipliers," providing selective access to 
facts and policy so they could rearticulate them "in the form of 
their own opinions" when they appeared as "independent" me­
dia analysts.50 Officials also multiplied their own message by 
quoting information reporters had obtained from their own of­
fice and published as if it were an independent source.51 Addi­
tionally, Bush Administration officials delayed delivery of the 
information that they chose to release, which allowed the unre­
butted executive department threat claims to become cemented 
in the public minds and made it difficult for members of Con­
gress to effectively use the information to assess and challenge 
executive degartment advocacy before the vote to authorize the 
use of force. 
sary to the country to investigate. Although the information that returned did not sup
port the executive department's suspicions, it did not publicly release it. Walter Pincus, 
CIA Did Not Share Doubt on Iraq Data; Bush Used Report of Uranium Bid, WASH. 
POST, June 12, 2003, at Al .  
47. Zachary Colie, Powell to Leave Cabinet Rice Likely t o  Move Up, S.F. CHRON., 
Nov. 16, 2004, at Al ("During the build up before the war, [Powell] urged the president 
to allow time for U.N. weapons inspectors to work and to build a broader coalition 
against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein . . . .  Despite his private disagreements, he staunchly 
defended the war. Powell went before the United Nations Security Council in February 
2003 to make the administration's case that Hussein was concealing weapons of mass de
struction."); Barbara Slavin & John Diamond, Case is Stronger When 'Biggest Dove' 
Makes It, USA TODAY, Feb. 6, 2003, at lOA (reporting Powell's UN speech). 
48. Mark Phythian, Intelligence Analysis Today and Tomorrow, 5 SECURITY 
CHALLENGES 67, 73 74 (2009), available at http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/ 
vol5no1Pythian.pdf (noting the failure of intelligence agencies to include dissenting views 
internally). 
49. S. REP. No. 108 301 , supra note 45, at 357. 
50. See David Barstow, Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon's Hidden Hand, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 20, 2008, at Al , available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/us/20generals.html 
(these private experts acknowledged that they sometimes repeated inflated threat 
claims) . 
51. See Michael Massing, Now They Tell Us, N.Y. Rev. OF BOOKS, Feb. 26, 2004, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/feb/26/now they tell us/ (recounting how 
administration officials appearing on Sunday morning talk shows referred to information 
about Iraq's alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons that appeared in a front page New York 
Times story and that originated in the executive department as if it were independently 
corroborated information); Michael R. Gordon & Judith Miller, Threats and Responses: 
The Iraqis; U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest for A Bomb Parts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 
2002, at Al. 
52. See S. REP. NO. 109 331, supra note 32, at 13 15 (describing process by which 
the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's Continuing Programs for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction was requested and created). 
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Members of the Bush Administration also used their control 
over the agencies and people who gather and analyze intelli­
gence information to influence the content of the raw informa­
tion gathered and the threat assessments to support their use of 
force policy. Most basically, executive department officials re­
peatedly suggested in their advocacy that intelligence informa­
tion and assessments were driving policy conclusions, when the 
reverse appears to have been the case.53 At the very least, mem­
bers of the Bush Administration did not encourage the indepen­
dent and thorough intelligent gathering and analysis that can be 
expected to produce the most accurate threat assessments.54 
They did not challenge analysts to break out of the "group 
think," and "mindset," and poor tradecraft practices that had led 
to past intelligence failures, including the very recent failure to 
discover and prevent the 2001 al-Qaeda attacks, and which the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found to have caused 
the Iraq misjudgments.55 Instead, executive department officials, 
particularly the Vice President, aggressively prodded intelligence 
analysts to discover information and provide threat assessments 
that would substantiate threat claims and support the use of 
force.56 In addition, these officials established a new group within 
the Pentagon to review intelligence data and produce and pro­
vide to the President "alternative intelligence assessments" em­
phasizing the Iraq threat.57 Two bipartisan reports concluded 
53. Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
Mar./ Apr. 2006, at 15; see also MELVIN A. GOODMAN, FAILURE OF INTELLIGENCE 225
52 (2008). 
54. See GEORGE TENET, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM 361 63 (2007) (describ
ing a December 2002 briefing with the President in which he presented evidence of Iraq's 
weapons' capacity: "At no time did [the President] or anyone else in the room suggest 
that we collect more intelligence to find out if the WMD were there or not."); see also S. 
REP. No. 108 301, supra note 45, at 23 ("In each instance where the Committee found an 
analytic or collection failure, it resulted in part from a failure of Intelligence Community 
managers throughout their leadership chains to adequately supervise the work of their 
analysts and collectors. They did not encourage analysts to challenge their assumptions, 
fully consider alternative arguments, accurately characterize the intelligence reporting, or 
counsel analysts who lost their objectivity. "). 
55. S. REP. No. 108 301, supra note 45, at 15, 20. 
56. See, e.g.' SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 
TO ABU GHRAIB 228 (2004) ("Senior CJ.A. analysts dealing with Iraq were constantly 
being urged by the Vice President's office to provide worst case assessments on Iraqi 
weapons issues."). 
57. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REVIEW OF 
PRE IRAQI WAR ACTIVITIES OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
FOR POLICY 2 (2007), available at http://ftp.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/ig020907.pdf (" [T]he 
actions were . . .  inappropriate given that the intelligence assessments were intelligence 
products and did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence 
Community. "). 
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that the intelligence analysts were not pressured by Administra­
tion offi�ials to conform their conclusions to fit the war policy.58 
Others have observed, however, that more subtle influences, 
that are more difficult to measure, likely conformed intelligence 
information and conclusions to support administration policy,59 
and some agencies, at least, have bureaucratic incentives to ad­
vocate that threats exist.60 
Incomplete Oversight of the Accuracy of Fact Claims. Selec­
tive presentation of facts by executive department advocates for 
the purpose of persuading Congress and the public to consent to 
policy occurs with respect to any decision framed for debate. 
With respect to most issues, however, executive department offi­
cials present their facts subject to motivated and aggressive over­
sight. Members of Congress, particularly of the opposite political 
party, journalists and media commentators, and private interest 
groups and entities usually have the incentive and ability to 
check the fact claims that executive branch officials assert in 
support of policy. The executive branch information control de­
scribed above impacts the ability of all of these sources to en­
gage in effective oversight of threat claims. But access is not the 
only barrier to effective oversight. Incentives, too, may be 
skewed when the President makes threat claims to persuade 
Congress and the public to consent to the use of force, and ap­
pear to have been skewed in the lead-up to the Iraq War. 
On paper, and written into the Constitution specifically, 
Congress has special authority to cut through executive branch 
secrecy to oversee the fact claims made to persuade it and the 
58. S. REP. No. 108 301(2004) supra note 45, at 357; THE COMMISSION ON THE 
INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF UNITED STATES 11 (2005), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmd/pdf/full_wmd report.pdf. 
59. See Joseph Cirincione et al., supra note 34, at 51 (it "strains credulity" to believe 
that the environment created by Bush Administration activities did not cause intelligence 
analysts to feel pressure to produce threat information) ; Warren P. Strobel, Some in 
Bush Administration Have Misgivings About Iraq Policy, McCLATCHY, Oct. 7, 2002, 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/128/story/8592.html (multiple intelligence analyst sources 
felt "under intense pressure to produce reports supporting the White House's argu
ment[ s ] ");see also Paul R. Pillar, supra note 53 (listing multiple ways more subtle than 
arm twisting by which intelligence was politicized in the lead up to the Iraq War); Cava
naugh, supra note 21, at 567 ("The Department of State and the CIA may be less inclined 
to present hawkish information [than the Department of Defense], but their institutional 
relationship with the president and Congress and their small size give them few resources 
with which to sustain opposition."). 
60. Cavanaugh, supra note 21, at 567 ("Since perception of threat is correlated with 
department budgets, prestige, and opportunities in the private sector, many bureaucrats 
have incentives to cooperate [with executive department threat inflation] in order to ad
vance either department or personal interests."). 
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public to consent to the use of force.61 With respect to the facts 
that form the basis of executive department advocacy, Congress 
has the power to oversee the intelligence collection and analysis 
processes, to require evidence and testimony from intelligence 
officials to explain the meaning of information gathered and the 
conclusions reached, and to review highly secret raw information 
that relates to its oversight responsibilities.62 Practical obstacles 
exist to Congress achieving parity with the executive branch in 
obtaining, understanding and reaching judgments about intelli­
gence information that bears on threat assessments.63 Still, Con­
gress's oversight efforts routinely fall short of what it could prac­
tically achieve.64 Critiques of Congress's failure to exercise the 
authority that it has to engage in effective ongoing intelligence 
agency oversight, and to diligently exercise its authority to con­
sent to and oversee the use of force, abound.65 Reasons that ex­
plain this pattern of neglect by Congress help to explain why it 
failed to effectively fact check executive department threat 
claims with respect to Iraq. These include the complexity and 
work load of intelligence oversight, the President's superior 
access to intelligence information and expert analysis, and the 
lack of public visibility of the work.66 Observers note that the rise 
of partisanship and the decline of individual work ethics lower 
61.  US CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (Congress has the power to declare war); Louis 
Fisher, Congressional Access to National Security Information, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
219 (2008). 
62. S.  REP. No. 108 301, supra note 32, at 7 ("The vast majority of intelligence 
products are available to Congress."); CRS, CONGRESS AS A CONSUMER OF 
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION (2009) (Congress routinely has access to finished intelli
gence products and information provided in briefings; although it does not have routine 
access to raw intelligence, it has obtained it upon request). 
63. See Loch K. Johnson, Governing in the Absence of Angels 16 19 (May 9, 2003), 
available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/johnson.doc (unpublished paper 
presented to the Wilson Center Congress Project) ("Lawmakers now have, in theory at 
least, access to all information that the secret agencies provide to the executive branch, 
with the exception of the President's Daily Brief. In reality, Congress frequently has to 
throw a fit before the agencies are responsive.") .  
64. Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and 
Overseeing Agencies in the Post 9111 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1671 73 (2006). 
65. See, e.g. , Denis McDonough et al. ,  No Mere Oversight, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS, June 13, 2006, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2006/06/ 
bl761097.html; Dahlia Lithwick, Wrestling Over War Powers, NEWSWEEK, July 21, 2008, 
at 18, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/145866 (observing that, with respect to 
war powers, many view Congress as a "constitutional bathmat") .  
66.  O'Connell, supra note 64, at 1660 63; McDonough et al . ,  supra note 65, at 27
28; Tim Poemer, Watching the Watchers: The Challenge of Intelligence Oversight, CTR. 
FOR NATIONAL POLICY, June 1 ,  2007. 
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the incentives of members to work hard and in a bipartisan way 
to oversee executive action regardless of party alignment.67 
In addition to these incentives generally, the Iraq expe­
rience reveals that the process of executive department decision 
making and advocacy can impact the incentives and practical ab­
ilities of Congress members to fact check administration threat 
claims. It is not clear exactly when the President made the deci­
sion to use force against Iraq.68 What is clear is that the question 
was not framed for decision by Congress until late summer 
2002.69 By that time, the Administration had made its decision, 
lined up England as an ally, and planned and begun implement­
ing a comprehensive strategic marketing campaign to persuade 
Congress members and the public to consent to the use of 
force.70 The President pressed Congress members to deliberate 
and decide quickly, during the two months between their return 
from summer recess and their break for the mid-term elections.71 
During this time, executive branch officials engaged in an ag­
gressive and targeted communications campaign aimed at con­
vincing Congress members, and particularly key opinion leaders 
in both parties, that the threat claims were true.72 These efforts 
67. See, e.g. , THOMAS E. MANN AND NORMAN J. 0RSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH 
(2006) (noting the rise of partisanship and the "Tuesday to Thursday" schedule general
ly). 
68. John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen M. Walt, Op Ed., Keeping Saddam Hussein in 
a Box, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2003, at 4 15, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2003/02/02/opinion/02MEAR.html?scp=l&sq=Mearsheimer%20Feb. %202, %20200 
3&st=cse; Memorandum from Matthew Rycroft to David Manning (July 23, 2002) (he
reinafter Downing Street Memo), available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ 
news/uk/ article38737 4.ece. 
69. The President initially claimed that he did not need Congress' consent to use 
force. Michael Powell, Appeals Court Weighs Bush's War Powers, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 
2003, at A14. In September of 2002, he changed his mind. Christopher Marquis, Threats 
and Responses: Congressional Memo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at Al 7 (the White 
House submitted a resolution to Congress seeking approval for the use of "all means that 
[the President] determines to be appropriate, including force"). 
70. See Warren P. Strobel & John Walcott, Bush Has Decided to Overthrow Hus
sein, McCLATCHY WASH. BUREAU, Feb. 13, 2002; Downing Street Memo, supra note 68 
(about information to be fixed around WMD); Joseph Cirincione, Not One Claim was 
True, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 65, 66 (reviewing JOHN 
PRADOS, HOODWINKED: THE DOCUMENTS THAT REVEAL How BUSH SOLD Us A War 
(2004)) (the White House Information Group was set up by Chief of Staff Andrew H. 
Card and chaired by Karl Rove in August 2002 to coordinate the campaign to convince 
Americans to go to war in Iraq). 
71. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Discusses Iraq, Domestic 
Agenda with Congressional Leaders (Sept. 18, 2002), available at http://georgewbush
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/print/20020918 l.html ("I want to thank 
the leadership for its commitment to get a resolution done before members go home for 
the election break."). 
72. MICHAEL ISIKOFF & DA YID CORN, HUBRIS: THE INSIDE STORY OF SPIN, 
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included a speech by the President before the United Nations 
General Assembly73 and to the Na ti on on the first anniversary of 
the September 1 1  terror attacks with a flood lighted Statue of 
Liberty as the backdrop,74 other public statements by other offi­
cials,75 documents detailing the threats,76 and classified hearings 
and briefings at which officials presented specific pieces of evi­
dence as undisputed and proving that Iraq posed a real and im­
mediate threat.77 These presentations were one-sided, in support 
of administration advocacy, and designed to reduce the incen­
tives of Congress members to engage in extensive fact checking.78 
The Administration delayed delivery of the most balanced in­
formation it presented to Congress, producing it only upon re­
quest by Senate committee members and not until three days be­
fore the vote.79 While the 92 page classified version was difficult 
for Congress members to access and understand,80 the short, un­
classified summary, which did not contain the balanced informa­
tion of the secret version, was freely available, to members, their 
SCANDAL, AND THE SELLING OF THE W AR (2006). 
73. President George W. Bush, Address to the United Nations (Sept. 12, 2002), 
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/2002/US/09/12/bush.transcript/. 
74. President George W. Bush. Address on Sept. 1 1 ,  2002 (Sept. 11 ,  2002), available 
at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/09/l 1/ ar91 l .  bush.speech. transcript/index.html. 
75. See S. REP. No. 110 345, supra note 1 (outlining many statements by Bush offi
cials that were later proven to be false). 
76. See, e.g. , A DECADE OF DECEPTION AND DEFIANCE; SADDAM HUSSEIN'S 
DEFIANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS (2002) (this served as President Bush's background 
paper for his September 12th speech to the United Nations General Assembly). 
77. See ISIKOFF & CORN, supra note 72, at 124 26 (describing briefings). 
78. In a statement several months later, the President's press secretary captured the 
gist of the mindset that the executive branch sought to instill through its advocacy efforts: 
"The president of the United States and the secretary of defense would not assert as 
plainly and bluntly as they have that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction if it was not 
true, and if they did not have a solid basis for saying it." David E. Sanger, Threats and 
Responses: Inspections; U.S. Tells Iraq It Must Reveal Weapons Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 
2002, at Al (quoting White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer). 
79. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) titled "Iraq's Continu
ing Programs of Weapons of Mass Destruction,'' was produced in a rapid timeframe at 
the request of the Senate Committee on Intelligence. See S REP. No. 108 301, supra note 
45, at 12 14 (describing requests by multiple members of the committee). An NIE is "an 
appraisal of a foreign country or international situation . . .  reflecting the coordinated 
judgment of the entire intelligence community." Loch K. Johnson, An Appraisal of the 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 1950 2005 6 (Mar. 26, 2008) (unpublished paper 
presented at the 49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association). Nei
ther the Director of Central Intelligence nor any executive official had requested that 
one be produced prior to seeking congressional authorization to use force in Iraq. 
80. Three days before the votes in Congress occurred, the classified NIE was made 
available to members of Congress in a secured location. Members were required to sign 
for access to the document. They could not take staff with them into the secure room, 
they could not remove the document from the room, and they could not take notes. 
Records indicate that very few members of Congress viewed the full document. Priest, 
supra note 40. 
2010] BUSH, OBAMA AND BEYOND 451 
staff, the media and the public.81 Although the public document 
was accessible, its release so close in time to the votes in Con­
gress diminished the ability of members of the media or private 
entities to analyze the advocacy piece, identify its weaknesses 
and publicize them in a way that could increase the incentives of 
Congress members to look more critically at the evidence pre­
sented by the Administration. Although not insurmountable, 
this sequence of rushed congressional fact finding and decision 
making after the President had already made his decision and 
planned and embarked on his persuasive advocacy campaign 
presented an obstacle that reduced both the incentives and prac­
tical abilities of Congress members to fact check executive de­
partment threat claims. 
Partisan and electoral considerations can usually be ex­
pected to motivate members of the opposite party to resist ag­
gressive executive department advocacy, and to take the time 
and engage in the effort required to check and contest the facts 
the President asserts in support of policy. But when those facts 
support threat claims in support of the use of force, experience 
indicates that these incentives may operate differently. For a 
number of reasons, threat claims are easier to make than they 
are to oppose.82 Voters reward leaders who make threat claims 
and carry through with a successful use of force.83 Politicians who 
question threat claims and prevent the use of force do not gen­
erally receive the same magnitude of electoral reward.84 In fact, 
politicians perceive that voters punish those who oppose a use of 
force that turns out to be successful.85 These political incentives 
specific to threat claims likely contributed to the decisions of a 
number of Congress members not to examine the evidence pre­
sented by Bush Administration officials more aggressively, to 
81. SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, PREWAR INTELLIGENCE 
ASSESSMENTS OF POST WAR IRAQ, S. REP. No. 108 301 ,  supra note 45, at 295 ("The in
telligence community's elimination of the caveats from the unclassified white paper mi
srepresented their judgments to the public, which did not have access to the classified 
National Intelligence Estimate containing the more carefully worded assessments."). 
82. See generally notes 23 25 supra. 
83. See, e.g. , Terrence L. Chapman & Dan Reiter, The United Nations Security 
Council and the Rally 'Round the Flag Effect, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 886, 886 
(2004). 
84. See MIROSLA V NINCIC, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN POLICY 1 1 8  (1992) 
(" [T]he electoral punishment for a mistaken underestimate of the Soviet challenge . . .  
has typically been greater than the punishment associated with a misguided overestimate 
of the threat.") .  
85. See James L. Regens et al. ,  The Electoral Consequences of Voting to Declare 
War, 39 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 168 ( 1995) .  
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acquiesce to the short time period for congressional decision 
making, and to vote to authorize the use of force.86 
While the electoral incentives likely had real effects on the 
behavior of Congress members, the reality of the perceptions on 
which they were based is less certain. A troubling possibility is 
that the legislators' deference because of their projection of vot­
ers' support for the use of force may in fact have helped to form 
it. That is, Congress members who thought the public would 
react negatively if they questioned the Administration's pro-war 
advocacy, and in particular the fact claims upon which the asser­
tions of grave and immediate threat were based, may have read 
the public wrong, or at least too strongly.87 Debate within Con­
gress or among members of Congress and the executive branch 
is crucial to identifying the issues and establishing credible, ex­
pert assessments of the facts upon which the public's opinion 
formation about policy depends.88 Although at a practical disad­
vantage vis-a-vis the President, Congress has greater authority 
than any other potential source of oversight to access and ex­
amine the evidence presented by executive officials to support 
their threat claims. To the extent that Congress members fail to 
exercise their special oversight authority because they predict 
that voters will punish them for doing so, public opinion may 
"echo" their failure to engage in effective fact checking rather 
than demonstrate that they would have been punished if they 
did. Additionally, by approving a resolution authorizing the use 
of force without the need of a further vote by Congress, that 
body effectively truncated its own debate. While Congress 
members could express opinions between their October 2002 
vote and the March 2003 use of force, they would carry much 
less weight, in the media and in the public's opinion formation, 
than the President's advocacy, because the decision in Congress 
86. See Elizabeth Drew, War Games in the Senate, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 5, 
2002, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2002/dec/05/war games in
the senate/; Louis Fisher, Deciding on War Against Iraq: Institutional Failures, 118 POL. 
SCI. Q. 389 (2003) .  
87. See FRANK RICH, THE GREATEST STORY EVER SOLD 63 (2006) ("The polls, far 
from rationalizing the Democrats' timidity, suggested that they might have won a real 
debate had they staged one.") ; Fisher, supra note 86, at 403 ("Why were Democrats so 
anxious about being seen as antiwar? There was no evidence that the public in any broad 
sense supported immediate war against Iraq.") .  
88. As to "elite discourse" generally, see Zaller, supra note 38, discussing media 
coverage. As to partisan cues, see Adam Berinsky, Assuming the Costs of War: Events, 
Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict, 69 J. OF POL. 975, 978 (2007), 
available at http://web.mit.edu/berinsky/www/war.pdf ( " [P]atterns of elite discourse the 
stated positions of leading Democratic and Republican politicians will play a large role 
in determining public support for war."). 
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was over, and the perception and reality was that the war deci­
sion was the President's to make. 
The media is another potential source of oversight. Al­
though members of the media have no legal right to access and 
evaluate classified intelligence information that is superior to the 
public, they have much greater practical access to information 
and experts whose evaluations bear on threat assessments, and 
they have professional responsibility to fact check government 
advocacy.89 Despite their access and public responsibilities, most 
media entities did not effectively fact check the Bush Adminis­
tration's threat claims before the use of force.90 The generally 
pro-war media coverage had a number of particular aspects. One 
was that the media reflected or embraced the patriotism that 
threat claims typically invoke.91 Another was that reporters in­
cluded information and advocacy volunteered by top executive 
branch officials, rather than digging for information or opinions 
offered by sources outside the Administration or by lower level 
employees.92 Reporting and commentary questioning the suffi-
89. See Marianne M. Jennings, Where Are Our Minds and What Are We Thinking? 
Virtue Ethics for a "Perfidious" Media, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 637, 
653 72 (2005) (outlining scandals at major newspapers and television stations where 
journalists have failed to fact check information they disseminated to the public) . 
90. Michael Massing, supra note 51 ;  Buying the War (PBS television broadcast Ap;. 
25, 2007), available at http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/btw/transcriptl .html ("I went 
back and did the math. From August 2002 until the war was launched in March of 2003 
there were about 140 front page pieces in The Washington Post making the Administra
tion's case for war. . . .  But there was only a handful . . .  of [opposition] stories that ran on 
the front page." (quoting Howard Kuntz, Washington Post media critic)); Editorial, The 
Times and Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2004/05/26/international/middleeast/26FTE_NOTE.html?pagewanted=l.  ("[W]e 
have found a number of instances of coverage that was not as rigorous as it should have 
been. In some cases, information that was controversial then, and seems questionable 
now, was insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand unchallenged. Looking back, we 
wish we had been more aggressive in re examining the claims as new evidence 
emerged or failed to emerge.") ;  Lorie Conway, Iraq War Documentaries Fill a Press 
Vacuum, NIEMAN REPS., Spring 2005, http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reportsitem. 
aspx?id=101078 (" [T]hree network news presidents agreed that their news coverage 
should have more aggressively challenged the Bush administration's reasons for going to 
war."). 
91. Some broadcast newscasters and commentators openly announced a duty to be 
patriotic in their coverage. David Folkenflik, Fox News Defends its Patriotic Coverage, 
BALTIMORE SUN , Apr. 2, 2003, at lD . Others tailored their coverage this way to meet 
what they perceived to be their viewers' preferences. CNN produced different versions of 
its war news for its United States and foreign audiences. Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 45 
(noting that CNN issued a "cheerleading" version of Iraq War coverage for U.S. au
diences and that partisan news organizations will deliver the ideological slant their au
diences want). 
92. A study of broadcast news prior to the Iraq War indicates that it quoted execu
tive department sources twice as much as any other source, and that these sources were, 
predictably, disproportionately in favor of the use of force. See Matthew Guardino & 
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ciency and credibility of the evidence that the Administration 
presented to support its threat claims did in fact exist, both be­
fore Congress voted to authorize the use of force and, in greater 
volume, before the war began.93 Nevertheless, reporting that 
generated misperceptions about the Iraq threat predominated in 
broadcast news94 and on the pages of opinion leading print publi­
cations as well.95 Incentives by media sources and individual re­
porters to get big scoops and publish high profile stories help ex­
plain why selected pieces of raw intelligence information that 
supported threat claims received prominent and uncritical cov­
erage.96 A critique of media coverage of Secretary of State Colin 
Powell's presentation to the United Nations Security Council 
pointed out that media reports frequently presented unverified 
Danny Hayes, Whose Views Made the News? (Apr. 3,  2008), available at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/6/6/4/p266648_index. 
html (unpublished paper presented at the 2008 annual meeting of the Midwest Political 
Science Association). 
93. Much information exposing the weakness of the administration's evidence or 
conflicting with its threat claims was available to the few journalists who actively pursued 
it. Knight Ridder reporters published a series of articles carefully examining the execu
tive department's threat claims. See generally Noteworthy Stories, 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/128/. One, in particular, compared a series of official state
ments with available evidence and the judgments of unnamed officials. Warren P. Stro
bel, supra note 5960. This piece exposes most of the weaknesses in the threat claims, not
ing, however, that " [n]one of the dissenting officials, who work in a number of different 
agencies, would agree to speak publicly, out of fear of retribution." Id.; Johanna 
McGeary et al. ,  What does Saddam Have?, TIME ON CNN, Sept. 16, 2002, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171 ,1003240,00.html; McGovern, supra 
note 22. 
94. Kull, supra note 31 .  
95. See Posting of  Max Fullmer to The Buffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2008/03/17/the reporting team that g_n_91981 .html (Mar. 17, 2008 18:29) ("In the 
months before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the reporters in the Knight Ridder Newspapers 
Washington D .C. bureau were virtually alone in their questioning of the Bush Adminis
tration's allegations of links between Saddam Hussein, weapons of mass destruction and 
international terrorism.") ;  Buying the War, supra note 90 ("We were under the radar 
most of the time . . . .  We're less influential [than the New York Times or Washington 
Post, even though they potentially have more readers] . "  (quoting John Walcott, one of 
the Knight Ridder reporters)) .  
96 .  The New York Times in particular ran several front page stories during the cru
cial stages of congressional and public opinion formation, which repeated and gave cre
dibility to details used by the administration to argue that Iraq posed an immediate 
threat. See Franklin Foer, The Source of the Trouble, N.Y. TIMES MAG. ,  May 21 ,  2005, 
available at http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/media/features/9226/ (describing how Judith 
Miller, a star New York Times reporter, became close to Ahmad Chalabi, the Iraq defector, 
and administration sources, and created numerous high profile stories that promoted the ad
ministration's case for war). Judith Miller has since left the New York Times, and in 2008 be
came a contributor to FOX News. Paul J. Gough, Veteran Reporter Judith Miller Joins Fox 
News, REUTERS, Oct. 20, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE49J80G20081020. 
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allegations as facts, rather than qualifying them as being asser­
tions in support of advocacy .97 
Additionally, the decisions of Congress members not to ex­
ercise their authority to fact check administration threat claims, 
through inquiry and public debate, contributed to the lack of 
critical examination of those claims in the media. As noted 
above, Congress members have the constitutional authority to 
access and examine most of the information that bears upon 
threat assessment, and to publicize much of it. At least, they can 
express judgments about its sufficiency and credibility, which can 
challenge the authority with which executive officials present the 
threat claims, and so present the type of "debate" about an "is­
sue" that reporters are trained to present. That is, debate and 
decision frame a newsworthy "story," and so, as congressional 
inquiry into the Administration's claims "melted away," report­
ers had to turn to less credible sources to balance coverage of 
administration threat claims and war advocacy.98 Scholars have 
reflected upon the challenge that this lack of debate among cred­
ible authority figures posed to public opinion formation with re­
spect to the Iraq War, since theory proposes that the public par­
ticularly needs educated experts and partisan cues to filter 
information with respect to foreign affairs.99 More than one ob-
97. Press Release, Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting, A Failure of Skepticism in 
Powell Coverage (Feb. 10, 2003), available at http://www.fair.org/press releases/un
powell iraq.html ("Reporters at several major outlets neglected to observe the journalis
tic rule of prefacing unverified assertions with words like 'claimed' or 'alleged."') . 
98. Stanley Feldman et al. ,  Going to War: When Citizens Matter 7 (Apr. 3, 2008), 
available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/6/5/2/ 
p266525_index.html (unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association). See Guardino & Hayes, supra note 92, at 15 19 (in the 
absence of domestic authorities offering anti war critiques, journalists turned to foreign 
sources, including Iraqi officials and citizens, as sources to balance their coverage of 
views, even though these views were likely to be accorded less weight than credible do
mestic sources by American viewers). 
99. Feldman, supra note 98, at 4 ("(F]oreign affairs provide an especially tough test 
of citizens' ability to arrive at reasoned judgment independently of the influence of polit
ical elites . . . .  The existence of disagreement among major political players is critical to 
balanced coverage of foreign affairs and domestic issues because of the media's tendency 
to attend most closely to the views of influential policy makers.") ;  William G. Howell & 
Jon C. Pevehouse, When Congress Stops Wars, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept. Oct., 2007, 
available at http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/09/when_congress_stops_wars. 
html ("Many studies have shown that the media regularly follow official debates about 
war in Washington, adjusting their coverage to the scope of the discussion among the 
nation's political elite. And among the elite, members of Congress through their own 
independent initiatives and through journalists' propensity to follow them stand out as 
the single most potent source of dissent against the president. . . .  Whether the media 
scrutinize every aspect of a proposed military venture or assume a more relaxed posture 
depends in part on Congress' willingness to take on the president."). 
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server has concluded that because the public did not have access 
to this debate through the media that the "marketplace of 
ideas," which is supposed to ensure consent to use of force deci­
sion making and in particular to limit the wars that democracies . f · 1  d lOO engage m, ai e . 
Finally, an important accountability check on executive ad­
vocacy with respect to domestic legislation is organized, affluent 
opposition. Private organizations spend money to influence leg­
islators and communicate with the public to oppose administra­
tion advocacy. These private organizations employ lobbyists who 
become experts in the facts and law that impact their interests. 
While lobbyists of course seek to persuade Congress members to 
act to further the policy goals of the organization that funds 
them, the private resources devoted to the particular subject 
area mean that lobbyists can do the hard work of collecting, un­
derstanding, and communicating the meaning of complex infor­
mation to very busy people for whom the issue is but one of 
many they must address. That private organizations wield cam­
paign contributions and other support that may enhance legisla­
tors' electoral success can counter other incentives and spur 
Congress members to take action to challenge facts or policy ad­
vocated by the President. 
Private organizations sporadically advertise and lobby Con­
gress members against the use of force.101 However, there do not 
appear to be private, affluent organizations that employ lob­
byists on a continuing basis to collect, understand and communi­
cate the meaning of threat assessment information to Congress 
members and members of their staffs, or at least none with a fi­
nancial incentive to question administration threat claims. 102 Of 
100. Kaufmann, supra note 20. See generally Cramer, supra note 22. See also A. Tre
vor Thrall, Framing Iraq: Threat Inflation in the Marketplace of Values, in AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF FEAR 174 passim (A. Trevor Thrall & Jane K. 
Cramer eds., 2009) (observing that "the most popular line of argument is that Bush was 
able to induce a failure of the marketplace of ideas," but arguing that a "marketplace of 
values" is a better way to understand how policy making should function). 
101. See, e.g. , Michael Crowley, Can Lobbyists Stop the War?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 
2007, at 6 54 (describing Americans Against Escalation in Iraq, a coalition brought to
gether by MoveOn.org to lobby Congress, noting that the group spent over $12 million in 
2007, and that its members are in frequent contact with the staffs of House and Senate 
majority leaders). 
102. Military contractors can be expected to favor the use of force generally. Oil 
companies can be expected to favor wars that make access to their product easier. Ano
tonia Juhasz, Big Oil's Last Stand, FOREIGN POL'Y IN FOCUS, Oct. 22, 2008, 
http://www.fpif.org/articles/big_oils_last_stand (Big Oil spends tens of thousands of dol
lars every year on lobbying the federal government, which is much less than the money it 
spends on elections. "Oil Change International compiled voting records for the five most 
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course, the lobbyists would not have the ability to access secret 
information to engage in ongoing threat assessment and educa­
tion for Congress members. Motivated lobbyists would, howev­
er, have the ability to prod Congress members and members of 
their staffs to demand and obtain threat assessment information 
on an ongoing basis. Although they could not review the con­
tents, they could motivate the process, inquiring about briefings 
and publicizing that they happened, and providing the questions 
to ask. 
With respect to the Iraq War then, it is no surprise that 
there appears to have been no organized, well funded private 
organization that employed lobbyists that helped Congress 
members and their staffs do the work of fact checking adminis­
tration threat claims before Congress voted to authorize the use 
of force.103 Some fact checking was done by private entities and  
individuals. Research organizations produced some commentary 
and reports that analyzed the evidence offered by the Adminis­
tration in support of its claims.104 And, prominent individuals 
with expertise and credibility, including officials associated with 
the first Bush Administration, pointed out the dearth of hard 
evidence offered by the Administration to support its threat 
claims and questioned the reasons offered for the use of force 
more generally.105 
important bills on the Iraq War: the initial 2003 vote authorizing the use of force in Iraq 
and the subsequent supplemental war finding bills in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. From 
1989 to 2006, members of Congress who voted for all five bills received on average eight 
times more money from the oil and gas industry . . .  than those who voted against the 
war.") .  
103. Opposition became more organized as  the war progressed. A number of groups 
funded advertisements against the 2007 troop surge. See, e.g. , Ryan Grim, MoveOn Al
ready Attacking Senators Blocking Debate on Surge, POLITICO, Feb. 6, 2007, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0207 /2659 .html. 
104. See, e.g. , INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, IRAQ'S 
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A NET ASSESSMENT (2002). 
105. See, e.g. , Peggy Noonan, Time to Put the Emotions Aside, WALL STREET J. ,  
Sept. 11 ,  2002, at A14 available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/pnoonan/ 
?id=l 10002249 (former speech writer to the first President Bush, asking for "hard data 
that demonstrate conclusively that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction which he is 
readying to use on the people of the U.S. or the people of the West"); see also Brent 
Scowcroft, Don 't A ttack Saddam, WALL STREET J., Aug. 15, 2002, at Al2, available at 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=ll0002133; James A. Baker, 
The Right Way to Change a Regime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002, at 4 9, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/25/opinion/25BAKE.html (former secretary of state 
James Baker warns that the United States should not attack Iraq alone); Mearsheimer & 
Walt, supra note 68; IN SHIFTING SANDS (Five Rivers 2000) (Scott Ritter documentary 
about the lack of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq). 
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In sum, both lack of access to intelligence information and 
disincentives by the surrogates upon whom the public relies to 
access and assess complex information that bears on policy deci­
sions to inquire more thoroughly into executive department 
threat claims led to incomplete oversight of the accuracy of the 
fact claims that formed the core of the executive department's 
use of force advocacy. 
II. USE OF FORCE ADVOCACY, THREAT CLAIMS 
AND THE QUESTION OF CONTEMPORANEOUS 
ACCOUNTABILITY DURING THE FIRST YEAR 
OF THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 
Although he inherited the conflict, Barack Obama is a war 
president, actively engaged in assessing threats, and in deciding 
upon and advocating for the use of force to address them. The 
use of force in Afghanistan, against the Taliban, which aided al­
Qaeda, which planned and committed the September 11, 2001 
attacks, has bled into Pakistan, 106 and is likely seeping into other 
regions as well.101 The troop commitment in Afghanistan has ris­
en significantly twice during the first year of the Obama presi­
dency.108 In September 2009, the President began a several­
month deliberation process, which culminated in a decision to 
increase troop strength in Afghanistan substantially. Immediate­
ly upon announcing the content of his decision, the President or­
dered its implementation. Both he and other executive depart­
ment officials have made threat claims as part of a strategic and 
coordinated communications campaign to persuade Congress 
and the nation to consent to his chosen policy. Additionally, dur­
ing this same time period, other threats emerged. Attacks 
against United States targets - some aborted and some success­
ful -unleashed a storm of inquiry into the accountability of this 
Administration for its threat assessments .109 Although the com-
106. Peter Baker, Obama's War over Terror, N.Y. TIMES MAG. ,  Jan. 4, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/0l/17 /magazine/17Terror t.html (over 50 drone strikes 
launched in 2009) ; Scott Shane & Eric Schmitt, CI.A. Deaths Prompt Surge in Drone 
War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2010/01/23/world/asia/23drone.html (over ten drone strikes in one month kill 90 
people in Pakistan) . 
107. Michelle Levi, Roundtable Looks at Yemen Terror Threat, CBS NEWS, Jan. 3,  
2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/0l/03/ftn/main6049967.shtml. 
108. See Barbara Starr, Obama Approves Afghanistan Troop Increase, CNN, Feb. 
18, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/17/obama.troops/index.html; see also 
Eric Schmitt, Obama Gives Troop Orders Be.fore Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1 ,  2009, at 
Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/world/asia/Olorders.html. 
109. See Borzou Daragahi & Greg Miller, U.S. Casts Doubt on Bin Laden Claim, 
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parison between the use of force decision making and threat 
claims made in support of policy of this President as compared 
to the last one must be imperfect,110 some insights can be drawn 
as to whether the structures, incentives and behaviors that im­
paired effective oversight have, or have not changed, with a new 
Oval Office occupant, a new Congress, and members of the me­
dia ostensibly committed to covering executive department 
threat claims less credulously. 
Aggressive and Persuasive Use of Threat Claims in Support 
of the Use of Force. The Obama Administration has assembled 
and operates a formidable advocacy machine, which it deploys 
strategically and persistently to build support for the President's 
policies. 111 The Administration uses multiple media and different 
forms of messages and appearances to find his audience and 
make his case. 1 12 The more traditional forms of communication 
include print interviews, broadcast media appearances, press re-
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2010, at 13 ,  available at http://articles.latimes. 
com/2010/jan/25/world/la fg bin laden25 2010jan25 (detailing the failed attempt to blow 
up an American commercial jet for which al Qaeda took credit); see also Posting of Jeff 
Zeleny to The Caucus: The Politics and Government Blog of The Times, 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/obama pays tribute to fallen cia officers/ 
(Feb. 5, 2010 16:43 EST) (seven CIA officers were killed in Afghanistan in a suicide 
bombing) ; Ashley Powers, A Story of Shock, Chaos and Bravery Unfolds, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 7, 2009, at Al (attack on Fort Hood); A.G. Sulzberger & William K. Rashbaum, 
Guilty Plea Made in Plot to Bomb New York Subway, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2010, at Al 
(guilty plea in plot to bomb New York subway). 
110. The Iraq War decision required a vote by Congress to authorize it. U.S .  CONST. 
art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power . . .  To declare War.") .  The decision to in
crease troop levels in an ongoing war does not clearly require a vote. But see Bruce 
Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, What Will Congress Do About Afghanistan?, SLATE, 
Dec. 9, 2009 (arguing that Congress "should repeal the open ended 2001 resolution and 
authorize Obama's 18 month surge through a new mechanism for ensuring the ongoing 
democratic legitimacy of limited wars");  David Rogers, Anti War Lawmakers Want a 
Vote, POLITICO, Dec. 1, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/30087.html 
("Anti war lawmakers in Congress are pressing for an early vote on funding for new 
troops in Afghanistan so that President Barack Obama's policy can be tested before 
thousands of additional Marines and soldiers are sent into combat.") .  
11 1. See Ken Auletta, Non Stop News, NEW YORKER, Jan. 25, 2010, at 38 47 (de
scribing the Obama communications operation and noting specifically that " [t]his White 
House, like others, does its best to manipulate press coverage"); K. Daniel Glover, The 
Cost of Controlling the Press, ACCURACY IN MEDIA, July 7, 2009, http://www. 
aim.org/aim column/the cost of controlling the press/ ("Overall, Obama is spending 
about 12 percent more for his communications operation than Bush $4.97 million com
pared with $4.44 million.") ;  Jennifer Senior, The Message is the Message, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Aug. 2, 2009, http://nymag.com/news/politics/58199 (the Obama Administration's 
communications operation is "very disciplined" and "highly selective about access"). 
1 12. John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, What About the Next 100? Obama in Ac
tion Part Vll: The JOOth Day, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, Apr. 30, 2009, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/obama_in_action_ viii_043009.php ("Obama's Strategy of 
Persuasion . . .  He has used the unilateral powers of the presidency more vigorously than 
any of his predecessors.") .  
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leases and the President's weekly address carried via radio and 
the web.113 The Administration also makes use of technologies 
that bypass traditional media to communicate with the public di­
rectly, such as web pages devoted to promoting its policies ,114 a 
Flickr stream on which it publishes �hotographs,115 YouTube re­
leases of interviews and speeches, 16 and Twitter posts of ex­
cerpts. 117 In addition to putting out a message, the executive 
branch employs means to search out and quickly counter infor­
mation that undercuts its policies.118 The President's chief of staff 
holds a daily conference call with political analysts who regularly 
offer "independent" media commentary.119 An end-of-the-year 
review caused the Obama Administration to retool its communi­
cations strategy in light of lessons learned during the President's 
first twelve months in office. The honed strategy will emphasize 
"disciplined messaging," in which "unhelpful themes [are] fil­
tered out in favor of topics that advance[] the [President's] 
goals," "quicker, more aggressive response to GOP attacks on 
the president and his policies ,"120 and "a return to the [relaxed, 
113. Thomas E. Mann, From Campaigning to Governing: Politics and Policymaking 
in the New Obama Administration, BROOKINGS INST , Apr. 21, 2009, 
http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2009/0421_governance_mann.aspx ("Obama has 
chosen to err on the side of overexposure. Hardly a day goes by without his public pres
ence, including speeches, press conferences, and meetings with members of Congress, 
CEOs, policy experts and ordinary citizens; exclusive interviews with network anchors 
and the national press; new access to minority media and sympathetic bloggers; an ap
pearance on Jay Leno and a return to 60 Minutes; weekly trips around the country, with 
extensive news coverage.") .  
114. See The White House Briefing Room, http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing
room. The President also has a Facebook page and blog. 
1 15. Stan Schroeder, Obama On Flickr: The First 100 Days and More, MASHABLE, 
Apr. 29, 2009, http://mashable.com/2009/04/29/obama flickr/ (photos depict Obama in a 
variety of situations: watching the Super Bowl in 3D, playing with a football in the Oval 
Office, or being briefed about the swine flu outbreak in the Situation Room). 
116. See Brian Stelter, Obama to Field Questions Posted by YouTube Users, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at AlO, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/0l/us/politics/ 
Olyoutube.html ("White House aides say the [YouTube) videos and webcasts are a po
werful 'force multiplier' for the administration's persuasion efforts.") .  
1 17. Senior, supra note 111.  
118. See Auletta, supra note 111 ,  at 46 ("Reality Check" blog established by White 
House to challenge false assertions); Posting of Macon Phillips to The White House 
Blog, Facts are Stubborn Things, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/facts are stubborn
things (Aug. 4, 2009 06:55 EDT) (asking readers to pass along information if they "get an 
email or see something on the web about health insurance reform that seems fishy"). 
119. John F. Harris, Power, Politics, Gossip on Daily Call, POLITICO, Jan. 27, 2009, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0109/18011 .html. 
120. Not surprisingly, some view the Obama administration's persuasive messaging 
techniques as heavy handed. Reporters complain about press control, selective access, 
and staged "town hall" events. Senior, supra note 1 1 1  (quoting long time White House 
correspondent Helen Thomas). The White House and FOX News have been at odds. 
White House Escalates War of Words With Fox News, Fox NEWS, Oct. 12, 2009, 
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out-of-Washington] backdrops" that were effective during the 
presidential campaign. 121 
The Obama Administration has used threat claims as a part 
of its strategic and coordinated communications campaign to 
build public support for his chosen policy to deploy additional 
troops in Afghanistan. The President's decision came after a 
three-month, highly publicized decision making process. Much 
anticipation and public conversation occurred during the Presi­
dent's deliberations, with widespread agreement that, once the 
decision was made, it would be his challenge to make his case 
and "sell" his chosen policy.122 Persuasive communications by ex­
ecutive branch officials have included formal speeches,123 Sunday 
talk show appearances, 124 congressional testimony, 125 direct media 
postings, 126 and documents delivered to Congress and released 
publicly. 121 In these communications, executive branch officials 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/10/12/white house escalates war words fox news/ 
(on September 20, the President visited all major Sunday morning talk shows except the 
FOX Channel's. Anita Dunn, then communications director, called it "a wing of the Re
publican Party"); see also Brian Stelter, Fox's Volley With Obama Intensifying, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at Bl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/12/business/ 
media/12fox.html. Some fault the administration's transparency efforts, particularly the 
whitehouse.gov web page, as geared more toward "public persuasion than documenta
tion." Mann, supra note 113. 
121 . Michael D .  Shear, Better Focus, Faster Response Part of Obama Communica­
tions Plan, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2010, at A06. 
122. See David E. Sanger, Obama's Task: A Tough Sell on Friendly Territory, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/23sanger. 
html; Obama Must Sell Afghan Surge, BREITBART, Dec. 16, 2009, http://www.breitbart. 
com/article.php?id=CNG.dflebb0b552b58e02cf23ff8b0dba97a.9fl&show_article=l ("US 
President Barack Obama will have to sell his escalation of the war in Afghanistan to his 
divided Democratic allies in the US Congress, Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi 
said."). 
123. Brian Montopoli, Obama Lays Out New Afghanistan Strategy, CBS NEWS, Dec. 
1, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/12/01/politics/main5855734.shtml (speech 
from West Point announcing the troop increase); President Barack Obama, Remarks by 
the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize (Dec. 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the press office/remarks president acceptance nobel peace
prize. 
124. Dianna Heitz, Sunday Talk Show Tip Sheet, POLITICO, Dec. 4, 2009, available at 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/30226.html ("Secretary of State Hillary Clin
ton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates headline this Sunday's television talk shows, as 
· they continue to make the case for the administration's strategy to deploy 30,000 addi
tional U.S. troops to Afghanistan and set a July 2011  deadline to begin a military with
drawal."). 
125. E.g. , Lynn Sweet, Hillary Rodham Clinton to Sell Obama Afghan Strategy to 
Congress, NA TO, POL. DAILY, Dec. 1 2009, http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/12/0l/ 
hillary rodham clinton to sell obama afghan strategy to congress/. 
126. E.g. , Posting of Jesse Lee to the White House Blog, The New Way Forward
The President's Address, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/0l/new way forward
presidents address (Dec. 1, 2009 21 :35 EDT) . 
127. See, e.g. , Annual Threat Assessment of the U. S. Intelligence Community: Hearing 
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have repeatedly asserted as true that the Taliban, which is lo­
cated in Afghanistan where force is to be applied (1) is offering 
continuing support, including weapons, to al-Qaeda, which per­
petrated the September 11, 2001 attacks; and that al-Qaeda (2) 
possesses the weapons capacity to pose an actual and immediate 
threat to the security of neighboring nations and the United 
States; (3) possesses the means of delivering the existing wea­
pons into neighboring countries, including the United States; and 
( 4) is inclined to attack other countries, including the United 
States. These types of threat claims have been broadcast and re­
ported in various media. One example is President Obama's 
speech to the nation from the Military College at West Point an­
nouncing his decision to send additional troops to Afghanistan: 
I do not make this decision lightly. I make this decision be­
cause I am convinced that our security is at stake in Afghanis­
tan and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of violent extremism 
practiced by al Qaeda. It is from here that we were attacked 
on 9/11 ,  and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted 
as I speak. This is no idle danger; no hypothetical threat. In 
the last few months alone, we have apprehended extremists 
within our borders who were sent here from the border region 
of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. . . .  
And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakis­
tan, because we know that al Qaeda and other extremists seek 
nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that 
they would use them. 
These facts compel us to act along with our friends and 
allies.128 
Additionally, officials have offered pieces of vivid imagery to 
support their threat claims. 129 
With this advocacy, the Obama Administration presents 
facts about threats posed by the Taliban in Afghanistan and al-
Before H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, l llth Cong. 16 19 (2010) (statement 
of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence) (assessing threat to national securi
ty posed by al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan). 
128. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the United States Military Academy at 
West Point, New York, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 962 (Dec. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the press office/remarks president address nation way
forward afghanistan and pakistan. 
129. Viola Gienger, Al Qaeda Heads Terror 'Mafia' with Afghan Nexus, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601087&sid=aqlbIZwRzjAM&pos=9# (quoting Secretary of State Hillary Rodham 
Clinton as describing "a syndicate of terrorism,'' in which, " [a]t the head of the table, like 
an old mafia diagram, sits al Qaeda").  
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Qaeda for the purpose of influencing the public discussion and 
conclusions about the policy the President advocates and seeks 
the Nation to embrace. By presenting threats posed by the Tali­
ban and al-Qaeda as actual, imminent, and potentially directed 
at the homeland, the President and his advisors argue that con­
fronting the threat by use of force is a necessity, not a choice.130 
To at least some extent, administration officials have attempted 
to present the justifications for war as simple and concrete, and 
in terms that invoked patriotism and emotions, all important 
elements to garnering public support for a costly foreign com­
mitment. 
The success of the Obama Administration's threat advocacy 
to build consent to the use of force is uncertain. Troops are be­
ing funded and deployed. Public opinion polls show varying sup­
port for the policy over time. 131 These polls generally do not ask 
specifically whether members of the public believe the executive 
department's threat claims or correlate belief in the truth of the 
threat claims to support for the use of force. More certain than 
the impact of executive department threat advocacy on the opi­
nion of Congress members and the public is that the Administra­
tion continues to communicate about threats and war events to 
build and maintain consent to its policies.132 That this Adminis­
tration and every one that follows can be expected to advocate 
in this way means that it is of continuing relevance to compare 
the past to the present to identify whether change has happened 
to correct the structures, incentives and behaviors that allowed 
executive department officials to make threat claims without 
contemporaneous accountability. 
Information Control in Support of Threat Claims. President 
Obama has superior legal or practical access to the intelligence 
information and opinions that formed the basis of his delibera-
130. See, e.g. , Peter Baker & Eric Schmitt, War Debate Now Leans to Focus on Al 
Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, at Al ("Robert Gibbs, the White House press secre
tary, said . . .  that Mr. Obama's 'primary focus is on groups and their allies that can strike 
our homeland, strike our allies, or groups who would provide safe haven for those that 
wish to do that."') .  
131. See POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htm. 
132. See Sulzberger & Rashbaum, supra note 109, at Al (Attorney General Eric 
Holder described the threat as one of the most serious since 9/11 :  "This attempted attack 
on our homeland was real, it was in motion and it would have been deadly.") ;  Greg Jaffe 
& Craig Whitlock, Afghan City Now Is More than a Battle, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2010, at 
A09 (Marj ah chosen as site of major military offensive because it is a "symbol" that will 
help the U.S. and military "define [the] narrative," which will "convince Americans that 
a new era has arrived in the eight year long war and to show Afghans that U.S. forces 
and the Afghan government can protect them from the Taliban"). 
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tions on the use of force and he has indicated that he intends to 
exercise that control to keep much of the information secret. In 
his multiple meetings he reviewed existing information and re­
ceived expert interpretation and advice from his advisors and 
staff that is not available to Congress, the media or the public 
generally. He directed the creation of new information to aid his 
deliberations, and reacted strongly when information about the 
content of the deliberations leaked in what the Administration 
perceived to be attempts to influence the President's decision 
making.133 The President did not request that the intelligence 
agencies prepare a National Intelligence Estimate to aid his de­
liberations on the surge.134 It is not clear which, if any, of the 
"three dozen intelligence reports" and "thousands of pages of 
documents"135 he directed be prepared as part of the process 
have been released to Congress, or, in unclassified version, to 
the public. It is unclear the extent to which this Administration 
would resist explicit requests for information by Congress, 
should it make them.136 
133. Peter Baker, Inside the Situation Room: How a War Plan Evolved, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 6, 2009, at Al,  available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/06/world/asia/ 
06reconstruct.html (noting that White House officials interpreted the leak of General 
McCrystal's report advising a troop increase as "an attempt to box in the president" and 
"were furious" when the general commented publicly that a plan less than the one he 
recommended would not work). 
134. Melvin A. Goodman, Obama's Weak Report Card on the CIA, 
CONSTORTIUMNEWS.COM, (Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.consortiumnews.com/2009/ 
113009a.html. The executive department delivers some threat assessment information to 
Congress on a yearly basis. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) delivers an an
nual threat assessment to Congress. See Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community, supra note 127 (statement of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelli
gence). 
Additionally, each president periodically publishes a document titled National Secu
rity Strategy of the United States of America, which explains the outlines and objectives 
of all national security activities, including the use of force. See NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY (2010), available at, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_ viewer/ 
national_security _strategy.pdf. 
135. See, e.g. , Baker, supra note 133; Spencer Ackerman, Clinton Ties Afghanistan
Pakistan War to Domestic U.S. Threat, WASH. INDEP., Dec. 3, 2009, 
http://washingtonindependent.com/69533/clinton ties afghanistan pakistan war to
domestic u s threat ("I am told by senior administration officials that the autumn Afgha
nistan Pakistan strategy was informed by 30 intelligence products.") .  
136. See Walter Pincus, Renewed Veto Threat on Security Proposal, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 16, 2010, at A04 ("The White House has renewed its threat to veto the fiscal 2010 
intelligence authorization bill over a provision that would force the administration to wi
den the circle of lawmakers who are informed about covert operations and other sensi
tive activities."). The Obama administration's record on release of information is mixed. 
Compare Ed O'Keefe, PO/A-Request Audit Shows Limited Gains, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 
2010, at A04 (report by the National Security Archive at George Washington University 
indicates that during its first year, the Obama administration denied more Freedom of 
Information Act requests than the Bush administration) ; Garry Wills, Entangled Giant, 
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This superior access to the entire body of intelligence in­
formation forms the implicit backdrop and grounding to the 
threat claims the President and others in his Administration 
make to persuade Congress and the public to consent to his poli­
cy choice. With respect to certain claims, executive branch offi­
cials rely on information that they do not reveal publicly to make 
their threat claims, suggesting that they have more and better 
quality supporting information than can be publicly revealed.137 
They omit mention of dissent when presenting the Administra­
tion's chosen policy and facts supporting it. 138 To some extent at 
least, executive department officials in their advocacy have 
asked the public to embrace the truth of threat claims based on 
trust rather than proof. It is difficult to gauge whether and to 
what extent Administration officials may be using their authority 
to classify and declassify information selectively for the purpose 
of influencing public debate in favor of their chosen policies. Al­
legations have been made that the Administration has released 
information that could have properly been classified for the pur­
pose of supporting its policies . 139 More difficult to assess is 
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 8, 2009, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/23110 (noting the 
administration's embrace of the "state secrets" privilege in litigation, its refusal to release 
photographs of "enhanced interrogation," and its objection to use of documents in litiga
tion); with Associated Press, Agencies Ordered to Publish Data, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2009, 
at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/us/politics/09records.html ("The 
White House instructed every federal agency on Tuesday to choose at least three collec
tions of previously undisclosed 'high value' government data and publish them on the 
Internet by the end of January, an ambitious order to make the administration as trans
parent as President Obama had promised it would be.") .  
137. See, e.g. , Lolita C. Baldor, Al Qaida Growing in Strength and Numbers in Afri
ca, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 1, 2010, reprinted in On The Defense Blog, 
http://onthedefense.wordpress.com/2010/03/01/recruiting boom aq sees major gains in
north africa causing fissure in already fragile local governments/ ("Al Qaida's terror 
network in North Africa is growing more active and attracting new recruits, threatening 
to further destabilize the continent's already vulnerable Sahara region, according to U.S. 
defense and counterterrorism officials [who spoke on condition of anonymity] .") .  
138. It is quite clear that the President was presented with information during his 
deliberations that conflicts with the decision he ultimately made. See Ken Dilanian, Black 
Eye for U.S. Embassy in Kabul, USA TODAY, Mar. 9, 2010, at lA, available at 
http://www. usatoday .com/news/washington/2010 03 09 embassy _N.htm (leaked cable 
from U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry questioning whether the military could meet its 
timeline to turn Afghanistan over to Afghan forces) .  Not surprisingly, this information 
does not form a part of the administration's advocacy in support of the troop increase. 
139. See, e.g. , Press Release, Senator Kit Bond, Bond Questions Motivation Behind 
Disclosure of Vital National Security Information to Media (Feb. 4, 2010), available at 
http://bond.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.NewsReleases&Conte 
ntRecord_id=9A51D6C2 9928 C9A3 FAE3 68770D080E43 (letter to the President from 
Senator Christopher S. Bond (R Mo.), Vice Chairman of Senate Intelligence Committee 
alleges that administration released classified information about cooperation of a terror 
suspect to defend its policies); Michael A Fletcher, White House Demands Apology from 
GOP Senator over National Security Briefing, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2010, 
466 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:433 
whether or to what extent Administration officials may be sup­
pressing release of damaging information of comparable sensi­
tivity for the purpose of bolstering public support of policy.140 
Top officials who had articulated facts and opinions that did not 
support Administration policy have come to embrace the alter­
native policy, at least, and state it publicly.141 Intelligence analysts 
have not spoken out to question the truth of the facts asserted by 
the President, which creates the impression that the facts he as­
serts in support of his threat claims represent the consensus of 
the intelligence community. Whether this is indeed true is diffi­
cult to assess. Members of the Obama executive department are 
undoubtedly targeting and communicating with private experts 
for the purpose of influencing the facts and opinions they . h ct• 142 present m t  e me ia. 
Although the structures have not changed to prevent this 
President from using his superior access to intelligence informa­
tion to support his advocacy, choices he has made, in his advoca­
cy and in the process of decision making, narrow, but do not 
eliminate, the extent to which he is contemporaneously unac­
countable for his threat claims. With respect to advocacy, this 
President does not rely as extensively as the last one on selected 
pieces of raw intelligence information to prove the threats that 
he argues justify the use of force. The Bush Administration re­
lied upon multiple pieces of intelligence information to prove 
several links in a chain that was necessary to persuade Congress 
and the public to consent to the use of force.143 This President's 
claims of certainty and unanimity are more limited and impor­
tant links in the chain of persuasion have open source verifica-
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/02/white house demands apology fr.html 
(White House press secretary explaining that "no classified information was shared when 
the administration briefed reporters") .  
140. See Richard B .  Cheney, Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute, avail
able at http://www.aei.org/speech/100050 (May 21, 2009) (accusing Obama administration 
of selectively declassifying Office of Legal Counsel memos that supported enhanced in
terrogation methods without also releasing information indicating that the methods 
worked). 
141 . Both Vice President Biden and Afghanistan Ambassador Eikenberry opposed 
the troop increase but now support it publicly. Michael Rubin, The Afghanistan With
drawal: Why Obama Was Wrong to Insist on a Deadline, AM. ENTERPRISE INST FOR 
PUB. PoL'Y RES. ,  Mar. 8, 2010, http://www.aei.org/article/101753. 
142. Harris, supra note 119. 
143. See, e.g. , Colin Powell, Secretary of State, Address to the United Nations Secu
rity Council, transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj .irq.powell. 
transcript/ (Feb. 6, 2003) (presenting multiple pieces of intelligence as proof that Iraq 
possessed weapons of mass destruction and had the motivation and capability to use 
them against other nations, including the United States). 
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tion. Al-Qaeda, the core threat at which use of force is ad­
dressed, has attacked the United States and open source infor­
mation verifies its intent and potential ability to do it again.144 
More controversial is the link between the danger to national se­
curity posed by al-Qaeda and the necessity to use of force in 
Afghanistan. The President and other executive branch officials 
assert this fact with certainty. Intelligence information, which the 
Administration has not released publicly, undoubtedly bears on 
this judgment.145 We cannot assess its sufficiency, the unanimity 
with which key assessments are agreed upon by intelligence ex­
perts or the credibility of the sources upon which the informa­
tion depends. To this extent, it is not possible with publicly 
available information to fully assess the accuracy of the threat 
claims asserted or the substance of the use of force decision that 
the President made.146 
Although we cannot fully assess the information that influ­
enced the substance of the policy choice, the process that this 
President chose to reach his decision provides some checks on 
his own use of information control to support his advocacy. This 
President actively advertised the deliberative process by which 
the decision to increase troops in Afghanistan was made.147 Dur-
144. Anahad O'Connor & Eric Schmitt, Terror Attempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite 
Device on Jet, N.Y. TIMES, DEC. 26, 2009 (Nigerian man arrested for attempting to ignite 
an explosive device on a plane on Christmas day); Sulzberger & Rashbaum, supra note 
109 (guilty plea in subway bombing plot linked to al Qaeda); Charlie Savage & Anahad 
O'Connor, Pennsylvania Woman Tied to Plot on Cartoonist, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010 
(woman going by the name JihadJane and linked to Al Qaeda was arrested in plot to kill 
a cartoonist); Zeleny, supra note 109 (seven CIA officers were killed in Afghanistan in a 
suicide bombing linked to al Qaeda). 
145. See, e.g. , Spencer Ackerman, supra note 135 ("Janet Napolitano, the secretary 
of homeland security [sic], said that there was a significant risk that 'recent arrests' like 
[N ajibullah] Zazi mean that terrorists have been 'sent here from the border region of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit more acts of terror. '  She said that Zazi's connec
tions to al Qaeda's senior leadership in that region were 'at most one step removed. '  
Watch this very carefully. How closely was Zazi actually connected to al Qaeda senior 
leadership? How anomalous or indicative is his case? What does his arrest represent 
about U.S. domestic capabilities relative to those of the al Qaeda 'syndicate'? And how 
much information will the Obama administration release to demonstrate the scope of this 
threat and these ties, as oppose [sic] to asserting them as self evident?"). Zazi has since 
pled guilty. Sulzberger & Rashbaum, supra note 109. 
146. Open source information assessing the Afghanistan/Pakistan/al Qaeda threat 
exists. See, e.g. , John Mueller, How Dangerous are the Taliban?, FOREIGN AFF., Apr. 15, 
2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/64932/j ohn mueller/how dangerous are the
taliban; ROLF MOWATT LARSSEN, BELFER CTR., AL QAEDA WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION THREAT: HYPE OR REALITY? (2010), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard. 
edu/publication/19852/ al_q aeda_ weapons_ of_mass_ destruction_threat.html. 
147. Auletta, supra note 111 ,  at 41 (The administration gave interviews to three pa
pers detailing the Afghanistan troop increase deliberation process. The papers were the 
New York Times, Washington Post and Los Angeles Times) . 
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ing this time, the President received information and deliberated 
before commencing his persuasive advocacy in support of poli­
cy.148 That the President took time, and reviewed many different 
types of expert information and analyses and listened to a num­
ber of different points of view provides some, albeit limited, as­
surance that the facts he asserts with certainty are supported by 
the best available evidence. The period of acknowledged delibe­
ration also allowed for fact finding and debate outside the execu­
tive branch, by Congress and in the media, before the Adminis­
tration be�an its aggressive and persuasive advocacy in support 
of policy.1 9 That actors outside the executive branch had notice 
that a decision was to be made provided the opportunity at least 
for independent, open source development of information, 
which could compete with threat claims the Administration 
would ultimately make. 
More important than the question of selective use of secret 
information in support of advocacy is whether the President is 
exercising his control over the people who gather and analyze 
intelligence to encourage accuracy independent of the Adminis­
tration's preferred policy. This is very difficult to assess. The 
flaws identified by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
in pre-Iraq War gathering and analysis included failures of ana­
lytic tradecraft, lack of information sharing, poor management, 
inadequate intelligence collection and a "groupthink" dynamic, 
which caused intelligence community members to conform re­
sults to a pre-existing mindset.150 The 9/11 Commission identified 
these and other failings related to information sharing, rivalries 
and coordination as inhibiting accurate detection and assessment 
of threats. 151 It is unclear the extent to which these structural and 
managerial flaws have been effectively addressed. 152 
148. See Baker, supra note 133 (describing a process that included "a full range of 
opinions and . . .  contrary points of view") . 
149. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a public hearing where it took 
testimony of experts assessing the threat. Confronting Al Qaeda: Understanding the 
Threat in Afghanistan and Beyond: Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 
111th Cong. (2009) . 
150. S. REP. No. 108 301, supra note 45, at 15, 18. 
151. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U. S. ,THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 407 410, http://www.9 11commission.gov/report/91 1Report.pdf. 
152. See, e.g. , Thomas H. Kean & John Framer, Jr., How 12125 Was Like 9111,  N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2010 ("Despite the best efforts of the 9/1 1  commission and other intelli
gence reformers, budgetary authority over intelligence remains unaligned with substan
tive responsibility. Turf battles persist among intelligence agencies. Power is sought while 
responsibility is deflected. The drift toward inertia continues.") ; Melvin A. Goodman, 
Op Ed., President Obama and the Intelligence Community: An Interim Report Card, 
TRUTHOUT, Nov. 24, 2009, http://www.truthout.org/1124095 (criticizing the President's 
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Reforms have been happening, as have critiques of the re­
forms.153 Many of the problems that detract from accuracy ap­
pear to continue to exist.154 What is apparent is that it is very dif­
ficult to make deep changes in practices within the vast, 
dispersed intelligence apparatus155 and, because of secrecy, diffi­
cult to establish benchmarks and public accountability as to the 
effectiveness of changes made. What can be said about this Ad­
ministration is that attention by opposition forces has been di­
rected specifically at the effectiveness of the existing systems for 
detecting and assessing threats.156 This Administration is aware 
that it will be held accountable for its threat detection results, 
which should make it attentive to the process. And there is some 
indication that it is experimenting with new ideas and methods 
to attempt to enhance accuracy . 157 
It is also difficult to assess the extent to which those who 
gather and analyze intelligence conform their work to support 
administration policy. Reports of the President's deliberation 
process with respect to Afghanistan suggest that he requested 
intelligence products to answer questions rather than support 
conclusions. There is no indication that members of the Admin­
istration are gathering information outside the existing intelli­
gence process. There appear to be no reports like the few that 
surfaced before the Iraq War of intelligence analysts feeling 
failure to "take a strong leadership role in addressing problems of the CIA"). 
153. Compare Intelligence Agencies Reel From Attempted Christmas A ttack (NPR 
radio broadcast Jan. 9, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. 
php?storyid=122394478 (Paul Pillar argues that the new structure is probably worse be
cause it adds two more stovepipes) with US Intelligence Reform: Improvement in Coun
ter Terrorism?, STRATEGIC COMMENTS, Oct. 2007. 
154. See, e.g. , Kean & Framer, supra note 152 (procedural fixes that are worth un
dertaking are "enhanced screening, or installing body scanning technology, or coordinat
ing the software used by intelligence agencies, or instructing State Department personnel 
to query the visa status of any person reported to be suspicious"). 
155. See, e.g. , Jane Mayer, The Secret History, NEW YORKER, June 22, 2009 (quoting 
a White House official speaking of the change in Leon Panetta after he took over as CIA 
director, "It's like 'Invasion of the Body Snatchers. '") .  
156. Peter Baker, Obama's War Over Terror, N.Y. TIMES MAG, Jan. 17, 2010, at 33 
("When the aviation screening and intelligence systems that Bush built failed to stop . .  ., 
[a] Nigerian with ties to Al Qaeda's branch in Yemen, from getting on a plane bound for 
Detroit with explosives in his underwear . .  ., a number of Obama's political opponents 
blamed the sitting president.") .  
157. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, White House Review Summary 
Regarding 12/25/2009 Attempted Terrorist Attack (Jan. 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the press office/white house review summary regarding
12252009 a ttempted terrorist attack; MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL T. FLYNN ET AL., 
FIXING INTEL: A BLUEPRINT FOR MAKING INTELLIGENCE RELEVANT IN 
AFGHANISTAN (2010), available at http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/ 
Afghanintel_Flynn_J an2010_code507 _ voices.pdf. 
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pressured to produce information to support administration pol­
icies. Incentives still exist, of course, for agencies and the people 
in them to produce information that supports administration pol­
icy and specifically that demonstrates that threats exist. So long 
as the heads of the intelligence agencies report to the President, 
they will have incentives to please him. Their career success will 
be tied into the success of the President's policies, and they will 
have incentives to support and defend it, which means that the 
d�nge� otpolicy influencing intelligence gathering and analysis will exist. -
Incomplete Oversight of the Accuracy of Threat Claims. Al­
though the circumstances and political dynamics are somewhat 
different,159 it is possible to make some observations about the 
ability and incentives of Congress, the media and private entities 
to oversee the accuracy of threat claims made by the Obama 
Administration. With respect to Congress, the institutional dis­
incentives to engage in vigorous oversight of intelligence activi­
ties and use of force decision making remain largely the same.160 
Congressional committees held a number of hearings after the 
President announced his decision, at which executive depart­
ment officials testified.161 It is unclear what classified informa-
158. See Posting by Michael Isikoff to Declassified blog at Newsweek, Brennan Plays 
Unusual 'Attack Dog' Role, http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/declassified/2010/02/08/ 
brennan plays unusual attack dog role.html (Feb. 8, 2010) (commenting on appearance 
of John Brennan, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, on Meet the Press to defend Obama adminis
tration counterterrorism policies, noting that "using Brennan in this capacity could have 
long term risks . . .  [because] Republicans (and perhaps some journalists) will likely be on 
guard for any sign he is slanting the intelligence for the president's political advantage"). 
159. The dynamics of partisan loyalty are shifted somewhat because it is a Demo
cratic president advocating the use of force. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 902 
(describing the phenomenon of "counter partisanship," which is that "presidents have 
greater credibility when they choose policies that cut against the grain of their party's 
platform or their own presumed preferences"). But see Patrick Egan & Joshua Tucker, 
The Hard Sell, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 22, 2009, http://www.tnr.com/article/the hard sell 
("Democratic presidents like Obama face a particular handicap when making major for
eign policy moves [including the use of force] .") .  
160.  One change is creation of the United States House Appropriations Select Intel
ligence Oversight Panel, on January 9, 2007, pursuant to H.R. Res. 35, l lOth Cong. 
(2007) as part of efforts to implement the recommendations of the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the "9/11 Commission". 
161. Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, supra note 127 
(statement of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence); Hearing to Receive Tes
timony on Afghanistan: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, l l lth Cong. 
(2009), available at http://armed services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2009/12%20December/ 
09 65%20 %2012 2 09.pdf (statement of Robert Gates, Secretary, Department of De
fense); U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: Hearing Before the H. Foreign Affairs Comm. , lllth 
Cong. (2009) ,  available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/ll l/53829.pdf (witnesses in
cluded Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Admiral & 
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ti on, if any, was made available to Congress members as part of 
this oversight and the degree to which individual Congress 
members or staff chose to review and assess it. Much political 
posturing and some factual inquiry occurred in Congress as the 
decision was being made.162 Focused oversight of the decision, 
however, could not happen since the President had not an­
nounced the decision he would make. The President's control 
over his own decision making process made effective congres­
sional review of the decision he made difficult, since he began to 
implement his decision to increase troops immediately upon an­
nouncing it rather than inviting a vote by Congress on the deci­
sion that he made.163 
Events during the Obama Administration confirm the po­
tency of threat claims, but indicate that their impact on political 
debate and oversight of executive branch advocacy and action 
may be different when the threat claims are made against the 
Administration and not by it, to support its own policies. While 
threat claims made by the prior Administration helped insulate 
it from effective oversight, threat claims made in advocacy 
against the Obama Administration contributed to political dis­
cussion and debate and may have contributed to enhanced over­
sight of intelligence gathering and threat assessment. In response 
to the interception and arrest of a suspect allegedly intent on set­
ting off a bomb on a plane bound for the United States on 
Christmas Day 2009, Republicans and the former Vice President 
most visibly, mounted a communications campaign advocating 
that threats exist that the current President does not properly 
acknowledge and address with appropriate policies.164 The for-
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen) . 
162. See Confronting Al Qaeda, supra note 149. 
163. The President asserted authority to commit troops without a vote by Congress 
pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force. Pub. L. No. 107 40, 1 15 Stat. 224 
(2001); President Barack Obama, Remarks at the United States Military Academy at 
West Point, New York, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 962 (Dec. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www. whi tehouse.  gov /the press office/remarks president address nation
way forward afghanistan and pakistan ("Just days after 9/11 ,  Congress authorized the 
use of force against Al Qaeda and those who harbored them, an authorization that con
tinues to this day.") .  Some Congress members and others argue that a vote is required or 
appropriate. See Perry Bacon Jr. , House Liberals Force Vote on Pullout from Afghanis
tan, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp dyn/content/article/ 
2010/03/08/AR2010030803787.html (Rep. Dennis Kucinich introduces resolution and 
achieves debate and vote on resolution to withdraw troops from Afghanistan); Acker
man & Hathaway, supra note 110. 
164. See Cheney Blasts Obama on Christmas Day Plane Scare, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 
30, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2009/12/cheney_blasts 
o.html. 
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mer Vice President's charges were perceived by the Administra­
tion as potent, and it acted forcefully to rebut them in its com­
munications, including deploying executive department officials 
into national advocacy roles specifically rebutting charges that 
the President and his Administration were "weak. "165 Congres­
sional Democrats worried about the impact of the threat debate 
on their prospects in the mid-term elections.166 Some degree of 
oversight and change occurred,167 although it is unclear how 
much if any of it can be attributed to the threat claims. What 
seems more clear is that threat claims are more likely to escape 
effective fact checking when they are made by members of the 
executive branch, who also have the authority to control release 
of the most credible information to support their claims. 
Members of the media are ostensibly chastened after their 
combined failure to effectively fact check the Bush Administra­
tion's threat claims with respect to Iraq.168 The memory of the 
recent experience, combined with different circumstances may 
mean that the current Administration's threat claims may be 
subject to somewhat greater media oversight. That this President 
chose to engage in an announced period of deliberation, allowed 
the media to frame a debate, and present credible and authorita­
tive expert opinions on the facts and the policy before the execu­
tive department began its advocacy.169 As with Congress, howev-
165. Obama Aides Hit Cheney Comments on Attempted Bombing, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Dec. 31, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2009/12/31/obama_aides_hit_ 
cheney_comments_on_attempted_bombing/; John Brennan, Op Ed., 'We Need No Lec
tures', USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 2010, at 9A; see also Helene Cooper, The Label Factor: Is 
Obama a Wimp or a Warrior?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2010/0111 O/weekinreview/1 Ocooper .html?. 
166. Ross Colvin, U.S. Spy Chief in Spotlight After Botched Plane Attack, REUTERS, 
Dec. 31, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5BT3S820091230 ("Republicans 
portrayed Obama as weak on national security even as he campaigned for last year's 
presidential election, and have sought to push that point before mid term elections in 
November, when they will challenge the Democrats' control of both houses of the U.S. 
Congress.") .  
167. The President acknowledged that the intelligence agencies under his direction 
had erred, Congress conducted numerous hearings to identify the errors and potential 
reforms and changes to intelligence gathering structures and methods have been made. 
Eric Lipton et al. ,  Review of Jet Bomb Plot Shows More Missed Clues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
18, 2010, at Al; Mark Guardino, More Changes to A irline Security after Christmas Day 
Incident, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 2, 2010, available at http://www.csmonitor. 
com/USA/2010/0402/More changes to airline security after Christmas Day incident; 
National Intelligence Director to Resign, CBSNEWS.COM, May 20, 2010, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/20/politics/main6503948.shtml. 
168. Sherry Ricciardi, Second Time Around, AM. J. REVIEW, Feb./Mar. 2008 ("After 
their credulous performance in the run up to the war in Iraq, how are the news media 
handling the Bush administration's allegations against Iran?"). 
169. See Jeff Zeleny, Deliberating on Afghanistan, in Plain Sight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
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er, the deeper structures and incentives that operated to deter 
effective oversight during the last Administration do not appear 
to have changed. Some media analysts contend that the broad­
cast and print news coverage is more supportive of the Adminis­
tration's use of force policy than is public opinion.17° Congress 
members who oppose the war complain that their critique does 
not get air time or prominent play in print.171 Administration 
sources continue to dominate the news about the use of force in 
Afghanistan.172 This Administration uses more direct communi­
cations techniques that allow it to bypass reporters than the last 
one, and through these media it can control the message that 
goes out. And, military officials have acknowledged that positive 
communication to the United States citizenry about the use of 
force there is crucial to its success,173 and can be expected to do 
all that they can to ensure that reporters deliver the favorable 
coverage they need. 
Some private, organized opposition to the use of force in 
Afghanistan exists. As with the Iraq War experience, however, 
these groups to do not have resources or expertise to examine in 
detail the facts asserted by the Administration in support of its 
policy.174 Research organizations, through publications and web­
sites, can engage in some degree of oversight.175 Still, the fact that 
15, 2009; Where is the Afghanistan Debate? When Public Support Slips, TV Packs in War 
Boosters, FAIR, Aug. 25, 2009, http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=3886 (Fairness & 
Accuracy in Reporting critique on narrow media coverage that ignores public opinion). 
170. FAIR, supra note 169 (polls are showing the American public is increasingly 
more critical of the war in Afghanistan, but media sources are interviewing more and 
more government officials who are in support of the surge). 
171. Kennedy Lashes Out on Afghan War, Media Coverage, Fox NEWS.COM, Mar. 
10, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/03/10/kennedy lashes afghan war media
coverage/ (quoting Congress member Patrick Kennedy about reporters' lack of interest 
in a House resolution requiring debate on whether to continue the war in Afghanistan, 
'"There's two press people in this gallery,' he shouted. 'We're talking about Eric Massa 
24 7 on the TV? We're talking war and peace, $3 billion, a thousand lives and no press? 
No press?"'). 
172. Daniel Ward, Act Now, Think Later in Afghanistan; Media Support for 'Surge' 
Comes Without a Real Plan, FAIR, Apr. 2009, http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=3753 
(study of media coverage on the Afghan surge finds that most media outlets support the 
surge and turn to Pentagon officials to discuss the issue). 
173. Jaffe & Whitlock, supra, note 132, at A09. 
174. The contrast between the private funds spent to influence Congress members 
on the recent health care legislation and on use of force decision making is striking. See 
Jeff Zeleny, Millions Being Spent to Sway Democrats on Health Care Bill, N. Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 15, 2010, at A01 (opponents of the President's policy spend over $11million dollars 
on advertising in a several week period to influence key Democratic votes; supporters 
matched that amount during the same time period). 
175. E.g. , FactCheck.org, http://factcheck.org/ (run by the Annenberg Public Policy 
Center of the University of Pennsylvania) . 
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advocacy for use of force consistently does not provoke orga­
nized, affluent private interest in fact checking and advocacy 
against the executive department's position, at least before the 
commitment of forces is made, points out the heightened impor­
tance of other sources of oversight in checking executive de­
partment threat claims. 
III. THE PROSPECT FOR FACT CHECKING EXECUTIVE 
DEPARTMENT THREAT CLAIMS IN SUPPORT OF USE 
OF FORCE ADVOCACY 
Many observers have criticized the pattern of contempora­
neously unaccountable executive branch threat claims support­
ing advocacy that leads to consent to the use of force, both gen­
erally and with respect to the Iraq War specifically. 176 Many 
reform proposals have surfaced. These focus on creating new 
structures or rules to enhance the accuracy of the intelligence 
product,177 to encourage executive branch officials to use intelli­
gence accurately in their advocacy,178 and to require Congress to 
exercise ongoing and critical judgment with respect to the fact 
claims made by executive branch officials in support of the use 
of force policy they advocate.179 If implemented and followed, 
these reforms could help ensure the contemporaneous accoun­
tability of executive department threat claims in support of the 
use of force.180 The problem, however, is that mechanisms that 
176. See Fisher, supra note 2; see also CATO INSTITUTE, CATO HANDBOOK FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 110 (7th ed. 2009), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/ 
hb111/hb111 10.pdf (members of Congress "dodge the issue" rather than "take responsi
bility").  
177. See, e.g, GOODMAN, supra note 53, at 329 56; Stanley Moskowitz, Uncertain 
Shield; Review of Intelligence in Recent Public Literature by Richard A. Posner, 50 STUD. 
IN INTELLIGENCE (2007), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center for the study of
intelligence/csi publications/csi studies/studies/vol50no3/U ncertain Shield_ 7 .htm (book 
review); Interview by Greg Bruno with Steven Simon, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle 
Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (Jan. 6, 2010) , available at 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/21 126/connecting_the_dots_on_intelligence_reform.html. 
178. The Executive Accountability Act of 2009 would apply criminal penalties to 
executive officials who knowingly and willfully make misstatements to promote the use 
of force. H.R. 743, 1 11th Cong. § 3(a) (2009), available at http://www.govtrack. 
us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill==hl 11 7 43 . 
179. MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, NATIONAL WAR POWERS COMMISSION 
REPORT 6 (2008), available at http://millercenter.org/policy/commissions/warpowers/ 
report (chaired by former secretaries of state, James A. Baker III and Warren Christo
pher); Michael J. Glennon, The War Powers Resolution, Once Again, 103 AMER. J. INT'L 
L. 75, 81 (2009) (describing proposals to reform the War Powers Resolution); Bruce Bu
chanan, Presidential Accountability for Wars of Choice, BROOKINGS INST. ISSUES IN 
GOVERNANCE STUD. (Dec. 2008) (proposing a policy trial for use of force modeled on 
the impeachment process). 
180. Promising reforms include increased whistleblower protections for intelligence 
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depend upon the will of government actors to enact and abide by 
them are subject to the incentives that have led to the behaviors 
that have in the past enabled executive department officials to 
make threat claims for which they are contemporaneously unac­
countable. Additionally, the judiciary cannot be counted upon to 
enforce structures or rules that apply to use of force decision 
making181 or require the President to release information that he 
determines should be kept secret to protect the national securi-
t 182 y. 
All of this means that, while new laws that effectively re­
quired the many actors in the use of force advocacy and decision 
making process to do their jobs responsibly might be most desir­
able, they are also the least likely to be enacted, or implemented 
in a way that makes them meaningful, at least in the short 
term.183 Without abandoning the hope of more comprehensive 
reform, some piecemeal progress toward the goal of ensuring the 
accuracy of executive department threat claims may be achieved 
by approaching the problem from the public, or listener side, of 
the communication exchange. Several key recognitions can help 
those who must ultimately consent to the use of force -members 
of the public- to evaluate the likely accuracy of executive de­
partment threat claims, or at least to assess the extent to which 
analysts, Cavanaugh, supra note 21,  at 583; oversight of intelligence activities by a non
partisan entity such as the Government Accountability Office, House Moves to Increase 
Oversight of Intelligence Community, OMB WATCH, June 15, 2010, http:// 
www.ombwatch.org/node/11071 , and increased and expert congressional staff focused on 
intelligence and use of force oversight, MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 
179, at 47. 
181. MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 179, at 6 ("Despite opportun
ities to intervene in several inter branch disputes, courts frequently decline to answer the 
broader questions [] war powers cases raise."); Barry N. Sweet, Legal Challenges to Pres
idential Policies on the Use of Military Force, 24 POL'Y STUD. J. 27 (1996) ("The judiciary 
has been accused of abdicating its responsibility when faced with legal challenges to the 
presidential use of force (citations omitted). A review of these legal challenges over the 
last 30 years demonstrates a judicial reluctance to make a ruling on the merits."); Michael 
J. Glennon, A Conveniently Unlawful War, 150 POL'Y REV. 75, 90 (2008) (noting the "ob
sequious judicial posture" in war powers cases). 
182. See, e.g. , Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege 
Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489, 537 (noting "the judiciary's tendency to defer to execu
tive privilege or to related pro secrecy claims, particularly where national security is in
volved") . 
183. See, e.g. , Glennon, supra note 179, at 77, 82 (noting that "Congress has already 
enacted a law requiring the executive to give the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs such information as they may request, 
without regard to classification, so long as the information relates to activities and re
sponsibilities within their jurisdiction" and that if "Congress truly wants to be included in 
the decision to go to war . . .  the constitutional means are available"); CATO INSTITUTE, 
supra note 176, at 1 12 (" [L]egislative schemes designed to force Congress to 'do the right 
thing' . . .  have proved little more effective than a dieter's note on the refrigerator.") .  
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they are verified, as well as to exercise the power they possess to 
prod surrogates with greater access or expertise in analyzing the 
relevant information to do so.184 
Presidents Speak as Advocates When They Make Threat 
Claims. Government speech comes in many different varieties. 
The same person, or entity, can speak at different times, in dif­
ferent ways. The President, in particular, is a public servant who 
speaks sometimes about facts as an implementer of national pol­
icy, and other times, as an advocate for facts that support poli­
cies that have not yet been embraced by the Nation's majority. 
These different types of government speech call on listeners to 
respond in different ways. The President speaks as an advocate 
when he presents threat claims to persuade the Na ti on to con­
sent to the use of force. 185 This means that listeners must evaluate 
the claims he makes, and the evidence he presents, as advocacy. 
While these recognitions may seem obvious, the Iraq War expe­
rience suggests widespread confusion among listeners about the 
President's responsibilities with respect to investigating and pre­
senting evidence that bore on the threat claims he made. It is not 
unusual that the incentives of a public servant who is also an ad­
vocate will be mixed with respect to the presentation of facts 
that bear upon the decision to be made. In the structured setting 
of trial, a prophylactic rule can help counter these mixed incen­
tives and address the imbalance in access to information in aid of 
more accurate fact finding and decision making.186 Solutions are 
184. Checklists can lead to concrete results even when their contents are very basic. 
Cf Atul Gawande, Op Ed., A Lifesaving Checklist, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, 4 8 (not
ing "stunning" results of a simple five point checklist reminder in preventing hospital 
infections). 
185. Presidents select information to present for the purpose of influencing those 
deliberations in favor of their preferred policies, and they employ speech writers who are 
professionally trained to use words and images that go beyond reason and logic to invoke 
emotions for maximum persuasive effect. See, e.g. , BEST, supra note 17, at 6 ("One prob
lem [with the use of intelligence information by policymakers] might be that the process 
by which White House speeches are drafted is less sensitive to the complexities of intelli
gence analysis than the policy making processes of the National Security Council.") .  
186. In the trial context, the Supreme Court has recognized that prosecutors bear 
these conflicting responsibilities. On the one hand, they are to protect the public by iden
tifying criminals and obtaining convictions. On the other hand, they are "the representa
tive [ s] . . .  of a sovereignty . . .  whose interest . . .  in a criminal prosecution is not that it 
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) 
(quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). Because of these conflicting 
incentives, to effectuate the Constitution's due process guarantee, the Court has imposed 
a prophylactic rule that requires prosecutors to deliver potentially exculpatory evidence 
to defendants. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  The prophylactic rule is de
signed, through the mechanism of information release, to "preserve the [constitutionally 
designated fact finding arena], as distinct from the [government advocate's] private deli
berations, as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about [the policy matter to be 
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less obvious in the context of public advocacy and decision mak­
ing. At least, the recognition that threat claims in support of the 
use of force are evidence in support of advocacy may instill the 
appropriate critical response by public listeners, who as fact 
finders must attempt, through congressional or media inquiry or 
otherwise, to verify the threat claims that are made. 
Process Can Provide Clues as to the Value of Intelligence In­
formation Offered in Support of Threat Claims Even If Its Sub­
stance Remains Secret. The President's control over the gather­
ing and content of intelligence information is highly significant 
to his ability to make persuasive threat claims in support of the 
use of force. To a certain extent, the President simply cannot be 
held contemporaneously accountable for the specific content of 
the threat claims he makes.187 Nevertheless, a few basic under­
standings about the process of reaching intelligence assessments, 
which is special, and about the nature of the raw intelligence, 
which is not so special, can be applied to executive department 
threat claims to help narrow the range of their contemporaneous 
unaccoun ta bili ty. 
Intelligence assessments are special because they use raw in­
formation gathered in range and depth that private entities can­
not rival, apply expert judgments that make use of experience, 
expertise, and multiple perspectives, and reach assessments that 
are as factually accurate as they can be without respect to how 
they bear on policy choices. Certainly, the process does not and 
cannot ever work perfectly. A process directed toward accuracy 
can, however, work better than a process that directs fact gather­
ing and assessment in support of policy. When the President 
makes threat claims to obtain consent to the use of force, it is 
possible , even without contemporaneous access to the content of 
the raw information or intelligence assessments, to make some 
judgments about whether the threat assessments asserted were 
reached through a process that carries the best possibility of en­
suring accuracy.188 While members of the public can ask these 
decided.] " Kyles, 514 U.S. at 440. 
187. See, e.g. , Glennon, supra note 179, at 77 ("Given the historical disinclination of 
the executive to share information with Congress, it is unduly optimistic to believe that 
[even a committee specifically charged by statute with the responsibility of consulting 
with the President about the use of force] would ever have access to all the information 
necessary to make an informed, balanced judgment in a crisis.") .  
188. Examples of relevant questions that can be answered with open source informa
tion include: When does it appear that the President decided to use force? Did the threat 
assessments available at that time justify the conclusion reached? Did the threat assess
ments change substantially over a short period of time, and if so, why? Are there any in
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questions and obtain some answers without assistance, they can 
also use the power they wield over Congress members or mem­
bers of the media to use their special access to information and 
sources to examine the process by which intelligence information 
is being produced and offered by the executive branch in support 
f 1. 189 o po icy. . 
While the process of intelligence gathering and assessment 
is special, the other important understanding is that raw intelli­
gence presented outside the context of analysis is not so special. 
Certainly, intelligence agencies have access to the widest range 
of information and, combined, have the best ability to reach an 
accurate intelligence product. But one important lesson of the 
Iraq War experience is that the two activities of intelligence ga­
thering and expert analysis must go together to produce a quality 
product. Pieces of raw intelligence presented to non-experts out­
side the context of analysis can be highly misleading if unders­
tood to be certain proof of what they seem to show rather than 
as the selected fact presentation of an advocate. In the con­
trolled arena of trial, checks exist to allow the fact finder to as­
sess the credibility and significance of the many pieces of raw 
evidence presented to prove the case. Of course, public decision 
making is not a trial, and the President has the actual or practical 
authority to keep much of the intelligence information that bears 
on threat claims secret. Nevertheless, some clues as to the credi­
bility and significance of pieces of raw intelligence can be gained 
by inquiring indirectly, not as to the specifics of sources or con­
tent, but as to the process by which the information was ob­
tained, deemed significant to threat assessment,190 and made pub­
lic to support the President's proposed policy. 
dications of unusual contact between policy makers and intelligence analysts? Are there 
any indications that raw intelligence is being gathered or released by policy makers with
out having been vetted through the process that applies in the intelligence community? 
More generally, has the President acted in a way that indicates confidence in the ability 
of the intelligence community to reach accurate assessments, and indicates a continuing 
intent to take actions to improve and rely upon the products it produces? 
189. See Paul R. Pillar, Pillar to Press: Don 't Be Fooled Again, NIEMAN 
WATCHDOG, Feb. 27, 2006, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
ask_this.view&askthisid=00181 (proposing questions for members of the media to ask 
when executive branch officials use intelligence information to support their advocacy). 
190. Relevant inquiries pertain to the degree of consensus within the intelligence 
community and whether the most expert agencies agree with the assessment put forth in 
executive department advocacy. See S. REP. No. 108 301,  supra note 45, at 28 (noting that 
Central Intelligence Agency analysts several times ignored judgments of more expert 
intelligence units on the meaning and significance of raw information) . 
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Citizens Can Impact the Incentives of Surrogates to Fact 
Check Threat Claims. Because incentives impact oversight of ex­
ecutive department threat claims so substantially, it makes sense 
to try to locate where they operate and to try to imagine ways to 
impact them even slightly. When executive branch officials ex­
aggerate threat claims, they depend upon the lack of ability or 
incentive of others to engage in effective fact checking before 
the decision to use force is made.191 This interdependency means 
that any action to enhance contemporaneous fact checking will 
impact the incentives of executive department officials to assert 
unverified threat claims in the first place. One small, but poten­
tially effective oversight activity would be to flip the successful 
executive branch communications technique of quickly identify­
ing misstatements and correcting them before the misstated in­
formation becomes cemented in the public's minds.192 Some me­
dia and web-based organizations do this sporadically.193 A more 
sustained effort could potentially impact the incentives of execu­
tive branch officials to overstate facts in their advocacy.194 
Another point of entry for citizen action is timing. The shorter 
the time period between when the use of force question is 
framed for debate and the decision making, the less likely facts 
asserted by the executive department in its advocacy can be 
checked effectively. This recognition suggests that those being 
asked to consent to the use of force be skeptical of claims of ur­
gency, and demand the time necessary to ask questions about 
the evidence presented and receive the answers. 
One reason that Congress members make the choice not to 
actively fact check administration threat claims because they cal­
culate that the electoral punishment for opposing a successful 
use of force will be greater than the punishment for failing to en­
gage in effective oversight. This incentive is difficult to under­
mine directly. An additional incentive, however, may be more 
susceptible to change. Congress members seem to calculate that, 
among the many choices they have about how to spend their 
191. See SCHUESSLER supra note 20, at 21 (" [P]ro war elites . . .  take a calculated 
risk that victory will be decisive [and so they] will be subject to little scrutiny about how 
they maneuvered the country to war.") .  
192. Auletta, supra note 111  ("Once a story gains traction, [Obama administration 
chief communications officer Anita Dunn] says, the Administration must respond quick
ly or 'rumors become facts."'). 
193. See, e.g. , FactCheck.org, http://factcheck.org/; see also Organization of News 
Ombudsmen, http://www.newsombudsmen.org/what.htm (media fact checking site). 
194. But see Brendan Nyhan, Op Ed., The Fight Is Over, the Myths Remain, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, at A31 (research shows highly ideological listeners may believe 
incorrect information more strongly after it is rebutted). 
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time and public capital, the electoral rewards for diligent over­
sight of executive department threat claims, and intelligence and 
use of force activities more generally, are slight. Change requires 
finding ways to make individual Congress members with the re­
sponsibility to oversee executive department threat claims, and 
intelligence and use of force activities, believe that their consti­
tuents will notice if they do the job well or poorly. Obviously, 
these methods, too, are hard to identify. But transparency and 
education are tools that could alter the dynamic somewhat. 
Some public education about Congress's oversight responsibili­
ties could help change assumptions about what Congress mem­
bers should have to explain. Congress members react to being 
called out publicly for their behavior. 195 When intelligence lapses 
happen, Congress members with responsibility for oversight 
should be named and asked to identify and explain the oversight 
actions engaged in on their watch.196 On the carrot side, perhaps 
there is some way to identify and reward hard work that particu­
lar Congress members do, even if it is done behind closed 
doors. 197 All of these moves are difficult to accomplish, but the 
Iraq War experience suggests that even slight changes in incen­
tives can make a difference in how members of Congress behave 
with respect to executive department threat claims. 
Media incentives are financial, and the incentives of report­
ers and media personalities is driven in large part by market 
forces as well, which means that both are difficult for citizens to 
influence to lead to more critical and careful coverage of execu­
tive department threat claims. Pressure from affluent advertisers 
may tend the opposite way.198 Many media entities police them­
selves.199 And, media watchdogs help to monitor media coverage 
195. See, e.g. , Carl Hulse, Senate Ends an Impasse Over Extending Jobless Benefits, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, at Al3 (Kentucky Senator Jim Bunning dropped objection to 
the extension of unemployment after other Republicans began to voice concerns on how 
the block would damage their "political brand") .  
196. See, e.g. , Andrea Seabrook, Congress Under Scrutiny Over Plane Bomb Plot, 
NPR, Jan. 8, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=122372392 
(claiming, without naming names, that several members of the 9/11  commission "say 
Congress should be delving into its own mistakes, too" in failing to engage in oversight 
that might have detected intelligence gathering and analysis problems that allowed the 
attempted bombing to occur) . 
197. Media profiles are a possibility. See, e.g., Peter Baker, The Limits of Rahmism, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 14, 2010, at 36 (New York Times Magazine profile of Rahm 
Emanuel) .  
198. See Buying the War, supra note 90  (citing advertisers calling TV stations about 
anti war coverage). 
199. Many newspapers have ombudsmen who comment on their paper's coverage. 
See, e.g, Organization of News Ombudsmen, http://www.newsombudsmen.org/what.htm. 
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of executive department advocacy.200 Even if it is difficult for citi­
zens to impact media incentives directly, citizens can take some 
types of indirect action to preserve the possibility of a media 
check on executive department threat claims. One of these is to 
preserve the possibility of professional, expert media fact evalua­
tion and delivery as an alternative to direct executive depart­
ment advocacy. Presidents commonly complain about "media 
filters" and work to get their messages out to the public unmodi­
fied.201 While reporters as a source of oversight are imperfect, the 
Iraq experience and events during the Obama Administration 
confirm that journalist intermediaries remain an important al­
ternate source of information to add balance to the increasingly 
ubiquitous direct media means of message delivery. Citizens can 
realize this, and vote with their dollars and their readership to 
preserve the content, even as the form modernizes.202 
CONCLUSION 
Too often Presidents have persuaded the Nation to consent 
to the use of force by making exaggerated threat claims. Al­
though some increased indicators of accuracy exist during the 
current presidency, that the threat claims depend in part on se­
cret intelligence information means that we cannot know for 
sure whether this is again happening. What we do know is that 
this President, like every one who came before him, is an advo­
cate, which means he will craft his presentation of facts to per­
suade the public to embrace his preferred policy. And the struc­
tures, incentives and behaviors that allowed members of the 
previous Administration to inflate threat claims remain largely 
the same. While it makes sense to work toward legal change, as 
an interim measure, it is necessary for the targets of executive 
branch advocacy to be aware that the facts presidents present 
will inevitably be inextricably intertwined with their advocacy, 
that threat claims in support of the use of force particularly im-
200. See, e.g. , Nieman Watchdog, Nieman Foundation for Journalism, http://www. 
niemanwatchdog.org/; FAIR, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, http://www.fair.org. 
201 .  Jonathan Martin, Obama Seeks Filter Free News, POLITICO, Mar. 24, 2009, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0309/20395.html ("It is the perennial hope of 
presidents especially early in their administrations that they can escape the filter of 
an often skeptical Washington press corps and communicate directly with a target au
dience.") .  
202. David Bauder, Survey: Readers Don 't Want to Pay for News Online, MYWAY, 
Mar. 14, 2010, http://apnews.myway.com/article/20100315/D9EER6CGO.html Uournalism 
study showing how readership of papers is holding steady even though the means of deli
very is the internet not print). 
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pact the incentives and behaviors of entities that could oversee 
the accuracy of those claims, and that such claims must be fact 
checked somehow to preserve democratic decision making. 
